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CURING THE FEDERAL COURT VACANCY CRISIS 
Carl Tobias• 
The federal judiciary has experienced a vacancy crisis, 
which has intensified over President Donald Trump's tenure 
when judicial openings significantly increased from the 105 
vacancies at his inauguration. Despite these concerns, 
analysts hail court selection as Trump's paramount success. 
This Article canvasses the rise and expansion of the crisis and 
scrutinizes the practices which Trump and the I 15th Senate 
instituted, as Republican concentration on quickly 
appointing many conservative appeals court judges resulted 
in departures from longstanding precedents and undermined 
the presidential discharge of constitutional responsibilities to 
nominate and confirm impressive jurists as well as senatorial 
duties to advise and consent. Finally, this Article surveys the 
implications of these procedures and proffers suggestions for 
the future. During the near term, the President should 
meticulously consult home state political figures and 
concomitantly revitalize deployment of ABA evaluations and 
ratings. The Senate, in turn, must analogously revitalize 
constructive devices, principally blue slips and complete, 
rigorous nominee hearings, committee discussions, and 
chamber debates. Over the longer term, the Republican and 
Democratic parties might consider effectuating a bipartisan 
judiciary, namely with the passage of judgeship legislation. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................... 884 
II. MODERN SELECTION DIFFICULTIES ........................................ 886 
A. Persistent Vacancies ......................................................... 886 
B. The Contemporary Dilemma .................................. ......... 887 
III. TRUMP ADMINISTRATION JUDICIAL SELECTION ...................... 890 
A. Nomination Process ......................................................... 890 
* Williams Chair in Law, University of Richmond. I wish to thank 
Margaret Sanner for her valuable suggestions, Jane Baber and Emily Benedict 
for their valuable research and editing, the Wake Forest Law Review editors for 
their exceptional research and editing, Leslee Stone for her excellent processing, 
as well as Russell Williams and the Hunton Andrews Kurth Summer Research 
Endowment Fund for their generous, continuing support. Remaining errors are 
mine alone. 
883 
884 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
B. Confirmation Process ...................................................... . 897 
C. Explanations for Nomination and Confirmation 
Problems ............................................................ ...................... 903 
IV. IMPLICATIONS .......................................................................... 906 
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FuTURE .............................................. 910 
A. Short-Term Suggestions .................................................. 910 
B. Longer-Term Suggestions ................................................ 914 
VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................ 919 
I. INTRODUCTION 
American citizens view President Donald Trump substantially 
less favorably than his Republican and Democratic predecessors, 1 
although public approval ratings for the White House remain much 
higher than the 115th Senate.2 The federal judicial vacancy crisis has 
also intensified over President Trump's tenure because empty seats 
correspondingly rose from 105 the month preceding his inauguration 
to 142 twenty months later.3 Despite those concerns, prominent 
analysts hail federal court selection as Trump's paramount success,4 
praising the record-setting confirmations of appellate jurists across 
his initial two years. 5 Because cascading, protracted vacancies are a 
conundrum of modern United States governance,6 the appointments 
process since Trump's presidency commenced deserves evaluation. 
Part II canvasses the rise and expansion of the vacancy crisis, 
appreciating that the crisis is comprised of persistent and current 
difficulties, the latter of which requires emphasis. Part III scrutinizes 
the judicial selection practices that President Trump and the 115th 
1. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Trump's Fifth-Quarter Job Approval Up; Still 
Historically Low, GALLUP (Apr. 24, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/233135 
/trump-fifth-quarter-job-approval-historically-low. aspx?version=print. 
2. See Eugene Scott, Trump's Approval Rating May Be Increasing, but the 




3. Vacancy Summary for December 2016, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeshi ps/judicial-vacancies/ archive-judicial-
vacancies/2016/ 12/summary (last updated Dec. 21, 2016) [hereinafter Vacancy 
Summary for December 2016]; Vacancy Summary for October 2018, ADMIN. OFF. 
OF THE U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-
vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2018/10/summary (last updated Nov. 10, 
2018). 
4. See Sahil Kapur & Laura Litvan, McConnell Cements a Legacy for Trump 
with Reshaped Courts, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 27, 2018, 4:00 AM), 
https://www. bloom berg .com/news/ articles/2018-04-2 7 /mcconnell-cements-a-
legacy-for-trump-with-reshaped-u -s-courts. 
5. See, e.g., Jordain Carney, Republicans Confirming Trump's Court 
Nominees at Record Pace, HILL (May 5, 2018, 4:52 PM), https://thehill.com 
/homenews/senate/385728-republicans-confirming-trumps-court-nominees-at-
record-pace. 
6. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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Senate instituted. An investigation of these practices reveals that 
Trump felicitously tapped a significant quantity of nominees, but the 
White House eschewed multiple venerable conventions-including 
the assiduous consultation of politicians from jurisdictions with 
unfilled slots as well as the comprehensive American Bar Association 
("ABA") candidate examinations and ratings--on which 
contemporary predecessors have deftly relied. Part III then assesses 
the confirmation process, ascertaining that the Judiciary Committee 
deemphasized several important norms, particularly the "blue slip" 
tradition-which proscribes hearings unless home-state politicians 
signal approval of choices-and the careful arrangement of hearings, 
which earlier panels had steadfastly respected. The Grand Old Party 
("GOP") Senate majority leadership similarly, albeit less frequently, 
violated numerous customs pertaining to Senate floor debates and 
votes. 
Part IV surveys the implications of these procedures, finding that 
more judicial openings exist now than at the Trump presidency's 
outset. Single-minded Republican concentration on quickly 
appointing conservative appellate court judges departs from 
longstanding precedents-notably robust consultation and 
employment of significant ABA input and blue slips-seemingly 
undermining both presidential constitutional responsibilities to 
nominate and confirm impressive jurists, as well as senators' 
fulfillment of their constitutional duties to provide advice and 
consent. Moreover, the sheer number of vacancies and their 
prolonged character have eroded the judiciary's constitutional 
obligation to swiftly, inexpensively, and fairly resolve cases. The 
Republican emphasis on ideology and counterproductive partisanship 
has made numerous jurists ideologically and rhetorically resemble 
the President and members of Congress and has sharply politicized 
the judiciary, thus somewhat decreasing public regard for the courts. 
Part V, accordingly, proffers suggestions for the future. During 
the near term, the President ought to meticulously consult 
home-state political figures and concomitantly revitalize the 
deployment of ABA evaluations and ratings. The Senate in turn must 
analogously revitalize constructive devices-principally blue slips, as 
well as rigorous nominee hearings, committee discussions, and 
chamber debates. Over the longer term, the Republican and 
Democratic parties might cautiously review endeavors to address the 
"confirmation wars" through global solutions, which include 
effectuating a bipartisan judiciary, namely with the passage of 
legislation that would authorize many new judgeships. 
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II. MODERN SELECTION DIFFICULTIES 
The history of judicial vacancies deserves little scrutiny here, as 
this background has been chronicled elsewhere7 and reviewed more 
extensively than the current vacancy problem. One essential notion 
is the persistent federal judicial vacancies dilemma that resulted 
from enhanced federal court jurisdiction, lawsuits, and judgeships.s 
The other salient facet contributing to judicial vacancies, the modern 
concern, is political and can be attributed to conflicting White House 
and Senate party control, which began thirty-eight years ago.9 
A. Persistent Vacancies 
Legislators enlarged jurisdiction in the 1960s,10 federalizing 
criminal behavior and fashioning new civil causes of action, which 
increased district court filings and corresponding appeals.11 Congress 
in turn responded by expanding judicial posts.12 In the fifteen years 
after 1980, confirmation times mounted.13 For instance, federal 
7. See generally KENNETH W. THOMPSON, MILLER CTR. CoMM'N, REPORT OF 
THE COMMISSION ON THE SELECTION OF FEDERAL JUDGES (1996) [hereinafter 
SELECTION COMMISSION]; Gordon Bermant et al., Judicial Vacancies: An 
Examination of the Problem and Possible Solutions, 14 MISS. C. L. REV. 319 
(1994). 
8. This notion needs less analysis; delay is intrinsic, resists felicitous 
solution, and has been assessed. See Comm. on Fed. Courts, Remedying the 
Permanent Vacancy Problem in the Federal Judiciary: The Problem of Judicial 
Vacancies and Its Causes, 42 REC. Ass'N B. CITY N.Y. 37 4, 376, 382, 384 n.3 (1987) 
(explaining the nonpolitical reasons for persistent judicial vacancies) [hereinafter 
Comm. on Fed. Cts.]; see also Bermant et al., supra note 7, at 322, 339, 344 
(explaining that persistent judicial vacancies do not solely result from the 
political process). 
9. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
10. See Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari and a National Study of the Appeals 
Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1264, 1270 (1996); SELECTION COMMISSION, supra 
note 7, at 3. 
11. See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. 
L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12643); Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 
327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 and 47 U.S.C.). 
12. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 44, 133 (2012); ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS IN U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/appealschronol. pdf (last visited Sept. 
29, 2018) [hereinafter CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS IN 
U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS]; AnMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS, CHRONOLOGICAL 
HISTORY OF AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/ sites/ default/files/Chronological %20History"/o20of'/o20A 
uthorized%20Judgeships%20%28pdf'/o29. (last visited Nov. 12, 2018); see also 
Federal Judgeship Act of 2013, S. 1385, 113th Cong. (2013) (proposing the most 
recent comprehensive legislation that would authorize an increase in the number 
of federal judgeships). 
13. JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S., LoNG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 
103 (1995), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files 
/federalcourtslongrangeplan_ O. pdf. 
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nominations spanned twelve months, while confirmations consumed 
three months.14 Conditions acutely worsened later. For example, 
circuit nominations demanded twenty months for appointments 
during 1997,15 the first year in Bill Clinton's last term, and in 2001, 
the earliest of George W. Bush's first term.16 
The confirmation process' convoluted steps and participants 
make some delay intrinsic. 17 Presidents consult home-state political 
officers, seeking advice respecting prospects. ls Senators in these 
jurisdictions depend on merit selection panels that evaluate aspiring 
judges and submit talented persons.19 The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation then undertakes intensive ''background checks."20 The 
ABA examines and rates candidates.21 The Department of Justice 
("DOJ") may help screen individuals and prepare nominees for Senate 
review.22 The Judiciary Committee analyzes presidential 
nominations, schedules hearings for candidates, discusses them, and 
casts votes.23 Those whom the panel approves might receive chamber 
debates, when necessary, preceding final ballots.24 
B. The Contemporary Dilemma 
Although federal judicial selection has always been infused with 
politics, Article II of the U.S. Constitution envisions that senators 
may limit unwise executive choices.25 However, partisanship has 
14. See SELECTION COMMISSION, supra note 7, at 3. 
15. See Carl W. Tobias, Postpartisan Federal Judicial Selection, 51 B.C. L. 
REV. 769, 771-72 (2010). 
16. See Sheldon Goldman, Judicial Confirmation Wars: Ideology and the 
Battle for the Federal Courts, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 871, 904---08 (2004); Orrin G. 
Hatch, The Constitution as the Playbook for Judicial Selection, 32 HARV. J.L. & 
PuB. POL'Y 1035, 1037-38 (2009). Each resembled Obama's initial and last two 
years. 
17. Bermant et al., supra note 7, at 320-21; Sheldon Goldman, Obama and 
the Federal Judiciary: Great Expectations but Will He Have a Dickens of a Time 
Living Up to Them?, 7 FORUM 8, 9--10 (2009). 
18. Bermant et al., supra note 7, at 321. 
19. Carl Tobias, Filling the Texas Federal Court Vacancies, 95 TEX. L. REV. 
1 70, 172 (2017). When at least one of the senators is a member of the President's 
political party, the President typically consults them. When both senators are 
not, the President normally consults these senators and the highest-ranking 
elected official of the President's party in the state, either the governor or the 
senior member of the House of Representatives delegation. 
20. Goldman, supra note 17, at 10. 
21. See SELECTION COMMISSION, supra note 7, at 4-5; see also AMERICAN BAR 
AssocIATION, THE ABA STANDING COMMI'ITEE ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY: WHAT IT Is 
AND How IT WORKS 1-2 (2002) [hereinafter ABA STANDING COMMITTEE]. 
22. Carl Tobias, Filling the Fourth Circuit Vacancies, 89 N.C. L. REV. 2161, 
2188 (2011). 
23. Stephan 0. Kline, The Topsy-Turvy World of Judicial Confirmations in 
the Era of Hatch and Lott, 103 DICK. L. REV. 247, 255 (1999). 
24. Tobias, supra note 19, at 1 72. 
25. THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke 
ed., 1961); see MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A 
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driven the judicial confirmation process and was enhanced when 
Richard Nixon constantly declared that he would impose ''law and 
order" by consciously appointing "strict constructionists,"26 while 
partisanship perceptibly expanded after D.C. Circuit Judge Robert 
Bork's monumental Supreme Court fight. 27 Politicization 
skyrocketed, and government was divided.28 The clear hope was the 
party that was not in control of the White House would recapture the 
presidency and have the opportunity to seat jurists, and that prospect 
promoted delay.29 
Relatively slow nominations might explain the dearth of 
confirmations. In early 1997 and 2001, Clinton and Bush nominated 
rather small numbers of circuit possibilities, and opponents criticized 
several.30 Politicians who tendered applicants often stalled the 
pace.31 Bush's minimal consultation limited selection,32 and 
negligible GOP review of Clinton judicial candidates may have driven 
paybacks.33 The committee shared responsibility because the panel 
slowly assessed, conducted hearings for, and voted on nominees.34 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 50 (2000); SHELDON GoLDMAN, 
PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LoWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH 
REAGAN 4 (1997). 
26. GOLDMAN, supra note 25, at 198; DAVID M. O'BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE: 
REPORT OF THE TwENTIETH CENTURY FuND TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 20 
(1988). 
27. See, e.g., MARK GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: AN INSIDER'S 
ACCOUNT OF AMERICA'S REJECTION OF ROBERT BORK'S NOMINATION TO THE 
SUPREME COURT 11-12 (1992); JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET 
WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 18-19 (2007). 
28. O'BRIEN, supra note 26, at 48. 
29. Id. 
30. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Clinton Nominates 
Twenty Two to the Federal Bench (Jan. 7, 1997), 
https://clintonwhitehouse6.archives.gov/1997/01/1997-01-07-names-of-twenty-
two-for-federal-bench-resubmitted.html; Remarks Announcing Nominations for 
the Federal Judiciary, 37 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 724 (May 9, 2001). 
31. Republican senators demanded to have input, and many lawmakers even 
recommended names to the White House. See 143 CONG. REC. 4253--54 (1997) 
(statement of Sen. Eiden); Carl Tobias, Recalibrating Judicial Renominations in 
the Trump Administration, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 9, 19 (2017), 
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr-online/vol74/issl/2; Neil Lewis, 
Clinton Has Chance to Shape Courts: But Republicans Hope to Thwart His 
Selections of Federal Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1997, at 30. 
32. See David L. Greene & Thomas Healy, Bush Sends Judges List to Senate: 
The 11 Nominees Are Carefully Selected to Mollify Democrats; Notable for 
Diversity; U.S. Appeals Court Candidates Include Vocal Conservatives, SUN 
(Balt.), May 10, 2001, at IA; see also Elliot E. Slotnick, Appellate Judicial 
Selection During the Bush Administration: Business as Usual or a Nuclear 
Winter?, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 225, 234 (2006). 
33. Paul A. Gigot, How Feinstein Is Repaying Bush on Judges, WALL ST. J., 
May 9, 2001, at A26; Neil A. Lewis, Party Leaders Clash Over Pace of Filling 
Judgeships, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2002, at A33. 
34. Compare 143 CONG. REC. 4254 (1997) (statement of Sen. Eiden) 
(asserting that Democrats conducted two hearings every month throughout 
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These phenomena meant that in 1997 and 2001, few candidates 
secured approval due to resource constraints and ideological 
differences. 35 Pressing chamber business and unanimous consent, 
which enabled one member to halt ballots, stymied numerous floor 
votes.36 
These factors worsened over more recent administrations. 
During President Barack Obama's tenure, Republican obstruction 
reached new depths,37 a situation best illustrated by the 
unprecedented refusal to even process Merrick Garland, Obama's 
Supreme Court nominee.38 After the GOP won a 2015 Senate 
majority, it did not evaluate most Obama prospects and confirmed the 
least number of jurists since Harry Truman was President, 39 leaving 
105 vacancies upon Trump's ascension.40 Given the shoddy treatment 
of Obama's choices by Republicans, it is not surprising that 
Democrats might appear relatively uncooperative by, for example, 
demanding cloture and roll call ballots for virtually all Trump 
candidates.41 
1987-94), with Carl Tobias, Choosing Federal Judges in the Second Clinton 
Administration, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 741, 744 (1997) (suggesting that the 
committee conducted one circuit nominee hearing a month when the Senate was 
in session). 
35. Tobias, supra note 34, at 753; Neil Lewis, Bush and Democrats in Senate 
Trade Blame for Judge Shortage, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2002, at A9. 
36. Jennifer Bendery, Republicans Still Find Ways to Stall Judicial 
Nominees Despite Filibuster Reform, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 8, 2014, 9:42 AM), 
https://www .huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/08/republicans-judicial-nominees _n 
_ 4 7 48528.html. 
37. Carl Tobias, The Republican Senate and Regular Order, 101 low AL. REV. 
ONLINE 12, 14 (2016). 
38. Carl Tobias, Confirming Supreme Court Justices in a Presidential 
Election Year, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 1089, 1100 (2017); see Robin Kar & Jason 
Mazzone, The Garland Affair: What History and the Constitution Really Say 
About President Obama's Powers To Appoint a Replacement for Justice Scalia, 91 
N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 58 (2016); Ruth Marcus, Opinion, Trump's Dangerous 
Plot to Weaponize the Supreme Court, WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trum ps-dangerous-plot-to-we a ponize-
the-su preme-court/2018/03/30/60b53a04-343d- l l e8-94fa-
32d48460b955_story.html. 
39. See 163 CONG. REC. S8021-24 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2017) (statements of 
Sens. Leahy, Feinstein, and Warren); see also Tobias, supra note 37, at 13 
(describing how Republicans repeatedly claimed that they were restoring 
"regular order," but the GOP failed to do so). 
40. Vacancy Summary for December 2016, supra note 3. 
41. See, e.g., 163 CONG. REC. S4613 (daily ed. July 31, 2017) (confirming the 
nomination of Kevin Newsom); 163 CONG. REC. S3124 (daily ed. May 24, 2017) 
(approving a motion for cloture to close debate on the n01nination of Amul 
Thapar); see also sources cited infra note 103 (finding that many Trump nominees 
received party-line committee approval). 
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III. TRUMP ADMINISTRATION JUDICIAL SELECTION 
A. Nomination Process 
Throughout the presidential campaign, Trump specifically 
promised to name and seat ideological conservatives on the bench, 42 
and he kept his pledge by mustering and confirming Justices Neil 
Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh as well as many similar circuit and 
district nominees. 43 This White House broke records for appointing 
circuit judges Trump's initial year with a dozen confirmations,44 
appointing even greater numbers the second year.45 Trump has 
ultimately tendered more nominees than recent predecessors.46 
Trump deploys some previously well-regarded conventions, even 
as he omits, ignores, or downplays several effective traditions. For 
instance, like every contemporary President, Trump assigns lead 
selection responsibility to the White House Counsel, Donald McGahn, 
places related duties in the DOJ, emphasizes appellate court rather 
than trial-level openings, and defers substantially on the latter 
vacancies to politicians in home states.47 
When forwarding appellate court nominees, the White House 
Counsel accentuates youth and conservative perspectives by, for 
example, applying litmus tests, which clearly include opposition to 
the administrative state,48 and relying mainly on the list of 
42. Tobias, supra note 38, at llOl, 1104. 
43. 164 CONG. REC. S6702 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 2018); Tobias, supra note 38, at 
llOl-02; see Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Votes 50-48 to Put Kavanaugh on 
Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2018, at Al. 
44. Confirmation Listing, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
http://www. uscourts. gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-
listing (last updated Oct. 19, 2018). 
45. Id. 
46. See Yuvraj Joshi, Neil Gorsuch's Legacy Is Already Devastating, SLATE 
(Apr. 4, 2018, ll:58 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/04/neil-
gorsuchs-legacy-is-already-devastating.html (sending a "torrent of judicial 
nominations: 69 in his first year in office, more than double Barak Obama's 34 at 
a similar point in his presidency."). 
47. Carl Tobias, Senate Gridlock and Federal Judicial Selection, 88 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 2233, 2235, 2239 (2013); Philip Rucker et al., 'He's Not Weak, Is 
He?:· Inside Trump's Quest To Alter the Judiciary, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/hes-not-weak-is-he-inside-trumps-
quest-to-alter-the-judiciary/201 7 /12/19/b653e568-e4de- l le7-833f-155031558ff 4 
_story.html?utm_term=.2013e35856cl; Charlie Savage, Hand Guiding President 
Through a Legal Storm, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2018, at Al; Michael Schmidt & 
Maggie Haberman, Lawyer for President Steps Down, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2018, 
at Al3. This deference is warranted, because home-state senators have greater 
familiarity with candidates who would be excellent judges in their jurisdictions, 
and senators must be accountable to the electorate for the appointment of these 
judges, while most district nominees are selected for their competence and will 
make less policy than circuit judges whose rulings govern multiple states. See 
infra note 66 and accompanying text. 
48. Jeremy W. Peters, Trump's New Judicial Litmus Test: Shrinking 'the 
Administrative State', N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018 
2018] CURING THE FEDERAL COURT VACANCY CRISIS 891 
twenty-one potential Supreme Court picks whom the Federalist 
Society and Heritage Foundation compiled in 2016.49 The above 
practices continue because the Federalist Society's Executive Vice 
President, Leonard Leo, advises Trump on selections.50 
No White House in U.S. history ceded this much responsibility to 
a nongovernmental entity, although President Bush may have 
derived some help from the Federalist Society.51 Trump's actions 
stress the circuit courts52 because they are courts of last resort for 
ninety-nine percent of federal cases, they articulate significantly 
more policy than district courts, and they issue rulings which cover 
several jurisdictions.53 Nearly all of his circuit judges are especially 
conservative, quite youthful, and very capable.54 
/03/26/us/politics/trump-judges-courts-administrative-state.html; see infra note 
130 and accompanying text. 
49. See Charlie Savage, Courts Reshaped at Fastest Pace in Five Decades, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2017, at Al; Jeffrey Toobin, Full Court Press, NEW YORKER, 
Apr. 17, 2017, at 24; Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Donald J. 
Trump's Supreme Court List, (Nov. 17, 2017) https://www.whitehouse.gov 
/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trumps-supreme-court-list/. For 
additional information on the Federalist Society, see generally .AMANDA HOLLIS-
BRUSKY, IDEAS WITH CONSEQUENCES: THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY AND THE 
CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION (2015) (detailing the work of the Federalist 
Society). 
50. Zoe Tillman, After Eight Years on the Sidelines, This Conservative Group 
Is Reshaping the Courts Under Trump, BuzzFEED NEWS (Nov. 20, 2017, 8:06 AM), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/ article/zoetillman/ after-eight-years-on -the-
sidelines-this-conservative-group; see Peters, supra note 48 (evaluating Leonard 
Leo's impact); Toobin, supra note 49. 
51. See Jason DeParle, Debating the Subtle Sway of the Federalist Society, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2005), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/01/politics/politicsspeciall/debating-the-
subtle-sway-of-the-federalist.html; Neil A. Lewis, Conservative Lawyers Voice 
Abundant Joy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004 
/11/13/politics/conservative-lawyers-voice-abundant-joy.html. But see 2017 
National Lawyers Convention: White House Counsel McGahn, C-SPAN (Nov. 17, 
201 7), https://www .c-span.org/video/? 437462-8/201 7 -national-lawyers-
convention-white-house-counsel-mcgahn [hereinafter 2017 National Lawyers 
Convention] (denying that the Trump White House outsourced judicial selection 
to the Federalist Society). 
52. Joan Biskupic, Trump Fast-Tracks Appeals Judges, but Lags on Lower 
Courts, CNN (May 25, 2018, 6:16 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/25/politics 
/appeals-district-court-trump/index.html. 
53. 163 CONG. REC. S8023-24 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2017) (statement of Sen. 
Feinstein); Tobias, supra note 47, at 2240-41. See generally GOLDMAN, supra 
note 25 (analyzing the strategies of presidential lower court appointments, 
especially for the appeals courts, from Roosevelt through Reagan). 
54. See Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary: Ratings of Article III 
and Article IV Judicial Nominees, 115th Congress, AM. BAR Ass'N (Oct. 16, 2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/GAO/Web 
%20rating°/o20Chart%20Trump%20115.authcheckdam. pdf [hereinafter ABA 
RATINGS] (showing the ABA's "well qualified" ratings for most of Trump's circuit 
court judges); see also Thomas Kaplan, Trump Is Putting Indelible Conservative 
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However, this administration contravenes, ignores, or 
deemphasizes vaunted traditions. Perhaps most essential is the 
failure to assertively consult home-state officials, 55 an efficacious 
custom that White Houses normally follow. That was a primary 
reason for blue slips, while during Obama's presidency the Senate 
Judiciary Committee Chairs only permitted hearings when both 
home-state politicians returned slips.56 Michigan, Minnesota, New 
Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Washington Democratic 
senators found that White House Counsel engaged in little or no 
active consultation respecting appellate openings that existed for 
their jurisdictions,57 and McGahn proclaimed that consultation was 
absent from the Constitution.58 Indeed, Senator Tammy Baldwin 
(D-WI) accused President Trump of marshaling a Seventh Circuit 
nominee, Michael Brennan, who actually lacked the requisite votes 
from a bipartisan selection commission, which had successfully 
examined, interviewed, and proposed judicial candidates for three 
decades, 59 Senator Bob Casey (D-PA) had concomitantly proffered 
Stamp on Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018 
10 7 /3 l/us/politics/trump-judges.html. 
55. See Kaplan, supra note 54. 
56. Robert Barnes & Ed O'Keefe, Senate Republicans Likely to Change 
Custom that Allows Democrats to Block Judicial Choices, WASH. POST (May 25, 
201 7), https://www.washingtonpost.com/poli tics/courts_la w /senate-republicans-
consider-changing-custom -that-allows-democrats-to-block-judicial-choices/201 7 
/05/25/d49ea61a-40b 1- l le7-9869-bac8b446820a_story.html?utm_term 
=.27d6dd280a05. 
57. See Jennifer Brooks & Stephen Montemayor, David Stras Gets Long-
Delayed Senate Hearing for Federal Judgeship, STAR TRIB. (Jan. 6, 2018, 2:44 
PM), http://www.startribune.com/minnesota-justice-david-stras-set-for-senate-
confirmation-hearing-wednesday/460755193/; Melissa Burke, Larsen's Hearing 
for Federal Bench Set for Next Week, DET. NEWS (Aug. 31, 2017, 9:56 AM), 
https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/poli tics/201 7 /08/31/larsen -federal-
judicial-hearing-set/105143430/; Kaplan, supra note 54; Zoe Tillman, Here's How 
Trump Is Trying to Remake His Least Favorite Court, BuzzFEED NEWS (Mar. 16, 
2018, 9:06 AM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/zoetillman/heres-who-
the-white-house-pitched-for-the-federal-appeals. But see Barnes & O'Keefe, 
supra note 56 (describing how Leonard Leo claims that the Trump 
Administration is engaging in a "vigorous consulting process" with senators). 
58. See 2017 National Lawyers Convention, supra note 51. 
59. See Nomination Hearing, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (Jan. 24, 2018), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/O 1124/2018/nominations; Tobias, 
supra note 47, at 2256; Craig Gilbert, Milwaukee Lawyer Michael Brennan 
Confirmed for U.S. Court of Appeals, Ending Long Vacancy Amid Bitter Partisan 
Dispute, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (May 10, 2018, 4:25 PM), 
h ttps://www.jsonline.com/ story/news/politics/2018/05/10/ senate-confirms-
michael-brennan -u -s-court-a ppeals/598340002/; Todd Ruger, Grassley Moves on 
Judicial Nominee over Baldwin's Objection, ROLL CALL (Jan. 24, 2018, 5:04 AM), 
https://www .rollcall.com/news/politics/ grassley-moves-judicial-nominee-
bald wins-objection; Bruce Vielmetti, Trump Court Pick Michael Brennan Faces 
Senate Judiciary Committee, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Jan. 24, 2018, 2:48 PM), 
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2018/01124/trump-court-pick-
michael-brennan -faces-senate-judiciary-committee/10619650011. 
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numerous well-qualified, mainstream candidates for White House 
scrutiny who received little consideration because Casey suggested 
that the executive had preselected another person who became the 
nominee.60 Another trenchant example of the White House 
consultation approach was furnished by Senator John Kennedy 
(R-LA) who argued in a Louisiana Fifth Circuit nominee's hearing 
that the White House Counsel had effectively instructed him whom 
the nominee was. 61 
A related major departure from relevant precedent was Trump's 
exclusion of the ABA from involvement with selection.62 All 
presidents who followed Dwight Eisenhower, save George W. Bush, 
comprehensively invoked ABA evaluations and ratings when 
nominating choices, while Obama dutifully refrained from mustering 
designees whom the ABA ranked not qualified.63 However, Trump 
marshaled six nominees who drew this rating, and the chamber 
approved one for a circuit position and two others for district slots.64 
60. See Executive Business Meeting, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (July 19, 
2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/07/19/2018/executive-
business-meeting (allowing a committee vote despite Senator Casey's slip 
retention and honoring Senator Toomey's for Obama Third Circuit nominee); 
Jonathan Tamari, Pat Toomey Used Senate Tradition to Block an Obama Pa. 
Judicial Pick. GOP Leaders Won't Give Bob Casey the Same Deference, PHILA. 
INQUIRER (July 17, 2018), http://www2.philly.com/philly/news/politics/pat-
toomey-used-senate-tradition-to-block-an-obama-judicial-pick-from-pa-gop-
leaders-wont-give-bob-casey-the-same-deference-2018071 7 .html. 
61. See Nomination Hearing, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMI'ITEE (Nov. 29, 2017) 
https://www .judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/11/29/201 7 /nominations; Todd Ruger, 
Senate Republicans Steamroll Judicial Process, ROLL CALL (Jan. 18, 2018, 11:33 
AM), https://www .rollcall.com/news/policy/the-senates-consent-machine; Sam 
Stein, GOP Pushes Back as Trump's Lawyer Tries to Stack the Bench, DAILY 
BEAST (Dec. 18, 2017, 4:23 PM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/trump-nominees-
humiliation-puts-spotlight-on-white-house-counsel-don-mcgahn; see also 
Kaplan, supra note 54 (discussing the White House Counsel's similar treatment 
of the New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon and Washington senators); infra notes 84-87 and 
accompanying text (discussing similar treatment of these senators-senators 
from Minnesota and Oregon and Senators Baldwin and Casey-by Senator 
Chuck Grassley, the Judiciary Committee Chair, when he refused to honor their 
blue slips). 
62. See Savage, supra note 49. 
63. 163 CONG. REC. S8021-24 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2017) (statements by Sens. 
Feinstein and Leahy); 163 CONG. REC. S8042 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2017) (statement 
of Sen. Durbin); Adam Liptak, White House Ends Bar Association's Role in 
Vetting Judges, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31 
/us/politics/white-house-american -bar-association -judges .html. 
64. 163 CONG. REC. S8024 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2017) (statement of Sen. 
Feinstein) (observing that the last judge with this rating was approved in 1989); 
ABARATINGS, supra note 54. GOP senators disputed Steven Grasz's ABA rating, 
arguing that the ABA is a liberal interest group. See Nomination Hearing, 
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov 
/meetings/1110112017/nominations (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley); Results of 
Executive Business Meeting, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (Dec. 7, 2017), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Results%20of0/o20Executive% 
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McGahn reportedly was so disenchanted with the ABA that he 
advised nominees to eschew cooperation when the bar association 
undertook its investigations.65 
The Executive relies upon more conventional procedures when 
suggesting district nominees. For instance, this White House, like 
recent predecessors, depends greatly on recommendations from 
home-state officers, and the administration bases most nominations 
principally on competence vis-a-vis ability to manage substantial 
caseloads.66 Plentiful submissions are excellent candidates and hold 
distinguished ABA rankings.67 However, three district nominees 
withdrew and two more were rated not qualified,68 partially because 
they failed to muster complete information or their hearing 
preparation lacked sufficient care.69 Despite these issues, Trump 
withdrew very few nominees and admonished Senator Kennedy and 
his Republican colleagues, advising them to discharge their advice 
and consent responsibilities by voting against his nominees whom 
they considered unqualified. 70 
The White House also ignores or underemphasizes multiple 
efficacious practices. One is the seeming dearth of effort to prioritize 
nominations by suggesting picks who reduce the 132 district court 
20Business%20Meeting%2012-07-17.pdf; 163 CONG. REC. S7288 (daily ed. Nov. 
16, 2017) (statement of Sen. Sasse); 163 CONG. REC. S7964-65 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 
2017) (confirming Eighth Circuit Judge Grasz); 164 CONG. REC. S5590 (daily ed. 
Aug. 1, 2018) (confirming District of Kansas Judge Holly Teeter); 164 CONG. REC. 
S5981 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 2018) (confirming Western District of Oklahoma Judge 
Charles Goodwin); infra note 170 and accompanying text. 
65. See Liptak, supra note 63; cf Savage, supra note 49 (finding that ABA's 
independent guardrail role is weakening). 
66. See Tobias, supra note 31, at 19, 25-26. But see Seung Min Kim, Trump's 
Judge Picks: 'Not Qualified,' Prolific Bloggers, POLITICO (Oct. 17, 2017, 5:05 AM), 
https://www. politico.corn/story/201 7 /10/1 7 /trump-judges-nominees-court-picks-
243834. 
67. Western District of Texas Judge Walter Counts and Northern District of 
Texas Judge Karen Gren Scholer are examples. See ABA STANDING COMMITTEE, 
supra note 21. 
68. See Rucker et al., supra note 47; Jennifer Bendery, Trump Judicial 
Nominee Drops Out After Embarrassing Hearing, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 18, 
2017, 1:35 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/donald-trump-judicial-
nominee-matthew-petersen_us_5a37ec14e4b0ff955ad51e82. 
69. See Elliot Mincberg, 4 Steps to Restore Thorough Senate Vetting of 
Judicial Nominees, HILL (Dec. 26, 2017, 1:30 PM), http://thehill.com/opinion 
/judiciary/366490-4-steps-to-restore-thorough-bipartisan-senate-vetting-of-
judicial-nominees; see also Bendery, supra note 68; Rucker et al., supra note 47. 
70. See Bendery, supra note 68; see also Press Release, Office of the Press 
Sec'y, President Donald J. Trump Announces Renomination of 21 Judicial 
Nominees (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-
actions/president-donald-j-trump-announces-renomination-21-judicial-
nominees/. But see Zoe Tillman, Trump Had a Good Year Confirming Judges, 
But He's a Long Way from Reshaping the Courts, BuzzFEED NEWS (Dec. 27, 2017, 
12:47 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/zoetillman/trump-had-a-good-
year-getting-judges-confirmed-but-hes (describing Leo's defense of McGahn's 
vetting). 
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and the sixty-three "judicial emergency" vacancies;n the U.S. Courts 
Administrative Office bases the latter on their protracted length or 
huge caseloads.72 Illustrative is that emergencies have multiplied 
since the GOP won the Senate.73 Trump moreover taps considerably 
fewer nominees in jurisdictions represented by Democrats, 74 even 
though many are inundated with a plethora of emergencies.75 In fact, 
California and New York together experience vacancies in twenty-one 
circuit and district court slots, more than half of which are 
emergencies. 76 However, Trump failed to recommend a single 
candidate for the New York vacancies until May 10, 2018, and Trump 
failed to nominate anyone for the California openings until October 
10, 2018.77 
71. Judicial vacancy and emergency numbers are based on October 19, 2018 
numbers. See Current Judicial Vacancies, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
http://www. uscourts. gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/current-judicial-
vacancies (last updated Oct. 19, 2018) [hereinafter Judicial Vacancies]; Current 
Judicial Emergencies, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov 
/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/judicial-emergencies (last updated Oct. 19, 
2018) [hereinafter Judicial Emergencies]. 
72. Emergency Definition, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL, 
http://www. us courts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/judicial-
emergencies/j udicial-emergency-definition (last visited Oct. 1, 2018); Judicial 
Emergencies, supra note 71; Savage, supra note 49. 
73. They skyrocketed from twelve to sixty-three. Compare Judicial 
Emergencies for January 2015, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-j udgeshi ps/judicial-vacancies/ archive-judicial-
vacancies/2015/01/ emergencies/html (last updated Jan. 1, 2015), with Judicial 
Emergencies, supra note 71. But see Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, 
President Donald J. Trump Announces Nomination of Indiana Attorney James 
Sweeney to Fill Judicial Emergency (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov 
/presiden tial-actions/president-donald-j-trump-announces-nomination -indiana -
attorney-james-sweeney-fill-judicial-emergency/; Press Release, Office of the 
Press Sec'y, President Donald J. Trump Announces Tenth Wave of Judicial 
Nominees (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions 
/president-donald-j- trump-announces-tenth-wave-judicial-nominees. 
74. See Judicial Emergencies, supra note 71; Press Release, Office of the 
Press Sec'y, President Donald J. Trump Announces Ninth Wave of Judicial 




75. See Judicial Emergencies, supra note 71. But see Office of the Press 
Sec'y, supra note 74 (nominating more from "blue" states). 
76. See Judicial Vacancies, supra note 71; Judicial Emergencies, supra note 
71. 
77. Data verify the priority accorded "red" states. See Press Release, Office 
of the Press Sec'y, President Donald J. Trump Announces Eighteenth Wave of 
Judicial Nominees, Eighteenth Wave of United States Attorney Nominees, and 




Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Donald J. Trump Announces 
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A third venerable approach which Trump jettisoned or 
downplayed was improving minority judicial representation. He has 
seemingly implemented no endeavors to recruit, identify, or confirm 
ethnic minorities or lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer 
("LGBTQ") candidates, such as assigning diverse employees to 
selection initiatives or encouraging politicians to recommend 
numerous minority candidates.78 Among the White House's sixty 
confirmed nominees as of October 2018, only Amul Thapar, James 
Ho, John Nalbandian, Karen Gren Scholer, Fernando Rodriguez, Jill 
Otake, and Terry Moorer are persons of color. 79 Moreover, of the 139 
Thirteenth Wave of Judicial Nominees and Seventh Wave of United States 
Marshal Nominees (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-
actions/president-donald-j-trump-announces-thirteenth-wave-judicial-nominees-
seven th-wave-united-states-marshal-nominees/ (sending a New York Second 
Circuit nominee); Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Donald J. 
Trump Announces Fourteenth Wave of Judicial Nominees, Thirteenth Wave of 
United States Attorney Nominees, and Eighth Wave of United States Marshal 
Nominees (May 10, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-
actions/president-donald-j-trump-announces-fourteen th-wave-judicial-
nominees-thirteenth-wave-united-states-attorney-nominees-eighth-wave-
united-states-marshal-nominees/ (sending seven New York district nominees); 
see also Nomination Hearing, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMI'ITEE (Aug. 1, 2018), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/08/0l/2018/nominations (hearing for 
New York circuit and district nominees) [hereinafter Aug. 1, 2018 Hearing]; 
Confirmation Listing, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
http://www. uscourts. gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmation-
listing (last updated Sep. 6, 2018) (confirming thirty-six judges and tapping sixty-
four nominees in states with two GOP senators; confirming nine judges and 
tapping twenty-six nominees in states with five Democratic senators); see also 
Judicial Emergencies, supra note 71. 
78. For the purposes of this Article, LGBTQ means openly disclosed sexual 
preference. LGBTQ individuals are considered "minorities" throughout this 
piece. See Stacking the Courts: The Fight Against Trump's Extremist Judicial 
Nominees, LAMBDA LEGAL, https://www.lambdalegal.org/judicial-nominees (last 
updated Oct. 16, 2018); Eleanor Clift, What Trump's Judicial Nominees Have in 
Common: They Really Don't Want LGBTQ People to Have Rights, DAILY BEAST 
(Mar. 12, 2018, 5:26 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/what-trumps-judicial-
nominees-have-in-common-they-really-don t-want-lgbtq-people-to-have-rights; 
see also Aug. 1, 2018 Hearing, supra note 77. 
79. 163 CONG. REC. S3179 (daily ed. May 25, 2017) (confirming Thapar); 163 
CONG. REC. S8033 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2017) (confirming Ho); 164 CONG. REC. 
Sl333 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 2018) (confirming Scholer); 164 CONG. REC. S2,661 (daily 
ed. May 15, 2018) (confirming Nalbandian); 164 CONG. REC. S5,590 (daily ed. Aug. 
1, 2018) (confirming Otake); 164 CONG. REC. S2981 (daily ed. June 5, 2018) 
(confirming Rodriguez); 164 CONG. REC. S5981 (daily ed. Aug. 28, 2018) 
(confirming Moorer); Judicial Confirmations for September 2018, ADMIN. OFF. OF 
THE U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies 
/archive-judicial-vacancies/2018/09/confirmations (last visited Oct. 10, 2018); see 
Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Donald J. Trump Announces 
Intent to Nominate Judge Amul Thapar for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-
actions/president-donald-j-trump-announces-intent-nomina te-judge-amul-r-
tha par-u-s-court-a ppeals-sixth-circuit/; Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, 
President Donald Trump Announces Seventh Wave of Judicial Candidates (Sept. 
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nominees, merely fifteen choices are people of color, and Mary 
Rowland is the only nominee who is a member of the LGBTQ 
community.so 
B. Confirmation Process 
The confirmation process distinctly resembles the detrimental 
elements of the nomination regime in several ways, principally by 
omitting, altering, or undermining longstanding customs or by 
abrogating, changing, or significantly diluting mechanisms which 
have proved effective. The best illustrations of these concepts are 
selective amendments to (1) the century-old policy for blue slips-
which permitted hearings once senators presented slips-and (2) 
committee hearing procedures. s1 
In autumn 2017, Chuck Grassley (R-IA), the Chair of the 
Judiciary Committee (the "Chair"), proclaimed that he would 
abruptly change the blue slip practice for appeals court nominees by 
scheduling hearings on prospects who lacked slips provided by two 
home-state members, especially when a legislator opposed the 
nominee for "political or ideological" reasons.s2 This decision modified 
the blue slip notion that Democrats and Republicans, including 
Grassley as the 2015-16 Chair, closely followed throughout all eight 
years in Obama's tenure.ss 
7, 201 7), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/president-donald-j-
trump-announces-seventh-wave-judicial-candidates/; Press Release, Office of the 
Press Sec'y, President Donald Trump Announces Eighth Wave of Judicial 
Candidates (Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions 
/president-donald-j-trump-announces-eighth-wave-judicial-candidates/. 
80. Thapar, Ho, Nalbandian, Scholer, Otake, Gujarati, Pacold, and Ranjan 
are Asian Americans; Rodriguez, Raul Arias-Marxuach and Ruiz are Latinos; 
Moorer, Smith, Alston, and Younge are African Americans. See Press Release, 
Office of the Press Sec'y, President Donald J. Trump Announces Twelfth Wave of 
Judicial Nominees, Twelfth Wave of United States Attorney's and Sixth Wave of 
United States Marshals (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov 
/presidential-actions/president-donald-j-trump-announces-twelfth-wave-judicial-
nominees-twelfth-wave-united-states-attorneys-sixth-wave-united-states-
marshals/. For additional information on the "waves" of nominees, see sources 
cited supra notes 73, 75, 77, and 79. 
81. See infra Part IV. 
82. 163 CONG. REC. S7174 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 2017); 163 CONG. REC. S7285 
(daily ed. Nov. 16, 2017); see Nomination Hearing, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMI'ITEE, 
(Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/11/29/2017 
/nominations; Memorandum to News Media, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMI'ITEE 
MAJORITY (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.toomey.senate.gov/files/documents/Blue 
%20Slip.pdf (describing the history of the blue slip controversy); Carl Hulse, 
Judge's Death Gives Trump a Chance to Remake a Vexing Court, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
8, 2018, at A13. 
83. Grassley followed this as Chair in Obama's last two years, and Patrick 
Leahy (D-VT) did the first six. See Executive Business Meeting, SENATE JUDICIARY 
COMMI'ITEE (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/02/15 
/2018/executive-business-meeting (statements of Sens. Grassley and Leahy). 
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That situation was exacerbated by permitting a January hearing 
for Wisconsin Seventh Circuit nominee Michael Brennan whom 
Trump proffered, although McGahn negligibly consulted Democratic 
Senator Tammy Baldwin, and the individual sent lacked the required 
evaluation committee affirmative votes.84 The situation was 
particularly troubling because Grassley minimally justified vesting in 
the Chair (himself) absolute discretion for concluding whether the 
Trump Administration had conducted adequate consultation about 
the nominee.85 Grassley continued that practice by scheduling a May 
hearing for an Oregon Ninth Circuit nominee, even though the White 
House minimally consulted with the Oregon senators, and the 
nominee purportedly withheld relevant information from a bipartisan 
selection commission which vetted candidates.86 The Chair 
correspondingly set a June hearing for a Pennsylvania Third Circuit 
nominee, although Senator Casey strongly opposed the choice and 
recommended several highly qualified candidates to the White House 
Counsel who rejected them after nominal consideration and little 
consultation with Casey.87 
Grassley explicitly recognized that blue slips were meant to 
guarantee that presidents consult home-state politicians, while 
84. See Nomination Hearing, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (Jan. 24, 2018), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/01/24/2018/nominations. 
85. Executive Business Meeting, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (Feb. 15, 
2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/02/15/2018/executive-
business-meeting; see infra text accompanying note 135. 
86. See Maxine Bernstein, Oregon's U.S. Senators Say Federal Prosecutor 
Ryan Bounds Unsuitable for 9th Circuit Vacancy, OREGONIAN (Feb. 12, 2018), 
https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2018/02/oregons_us_senators_sa 
y_federa.html (analyzing the four picks, including Bounds, whom the panel 
recommended and senators' reasons for continuing to oppose Bounds); Jimmy 
Hoover & Michael Macagnone, 9th Circ. Pick Forces Grassley to Choose: Trump 
or Tradition?, LAw360 (Mar. 29, 2018, 3:43 PM), https://www.law360.com 
/articles/1025855; see also Nomination Hearing, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 
(May 9, 2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/05/09/2018 
/nominations; Executive Business Meeting, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (June 
7, 2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/06/07/2018/executive-
business-meeting (11-10 party-line panel approval); 164 CONG. REC. S5098 (daily 
ed. July 19, 2018) (withdrawing the nomination). 
87. See Nomination Hearing, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (June 6, 2018), 
https://www .judiciary.senate. gov/meetings/06/06/2018/nomina tions; Tracie 
Mauriello, Why Bob Casey Thinks the Confirmation Hearing for Pittsburgh 
Attorney David Porter Is Breaking Protocol, POST-GAZETTE (June 4, 2018, 11:29 
PM), http://www.post-gazette.com/news/politics-nation/2018/06/04/David-Porter-
third-circuit-court-a ppeals-confirma tion-hearing-Senate-judiciary-committee-
bob-casey-chuck-grassley-blue-slip/stories/201806040156 (allowing hearing, 
despite Senator Casey's blue slip retention and honoring Senator Toomey's for 
Obama nominee). Grassley similarly treated Ohio, Washington, and New Jersey 
senators by not honoring the senators' retention of blue slips and by scheduling 
hearings on appellate court nominees from their states. See Nomination Hearing, 
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov 
/meetings/10/10/2018/nominations (hearing for Ohio Sixth Circuit nominees Eric 
Murphy and Chad Readler). 
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strongly protecting senators' prerogatives in the selection process and 
the essential interests of voters whom they directly represent.88 
Moreover, GOP lawmakers had vigorously capitalized on blue slips to 
obstruct well-qualified, mainstream nominees during the Obama 
Administration, many for political or ideological reasons, the very 
bases which the Chair expressly decried as illegitimate.89 
Grassley concomitantly altered numerous conventions and 
multiple strictures regarding hearings. Peculiarly compelling was his 
scheduling of five hearings last year at which two circuit, and often 
four district, court nominees testified without minority party 
approval.90 This contrasted remarkably with Democrats' setting a 
paltry three similar hearings across the eight Obama years for a pair 
of circuit nominees, and then in special circumstances and with 
Republican permission.91 Most notorious was Grassley' scheduling a 
major hearing for two controversial appellate candidates, four district 
nominees, and the ABA representative, who cogently explained the 
much-disputed not qualified rating accorded a Trump circuit 
nominee.92 The session which the panel mounted was so packed that 
the district nominees who appeared only had time for introducing 
themselves.93 
Many hearings, especially which implicated appellate court 
nominees, seemed rushed with a lack of due care appropriate for 
persons who can enjoy life-tenured appointments on "Supreme 
88. 163 CONG. REC. S7,174 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 2017). 
89. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. Many GOP senators even 
offered no reasons. See sources cited supra notes 37, 56, 83-84. 
90. 163 CONG. REC. S8021-24 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2017) (statement of Sens. 
Feinstein, Leahy, and Warren) 
91. Id. (statement of Sen. Leahy). For example, North Carolina Fourth 
Circuit nominees Albert Diaz and James Wynn were tapped the same day and 
were considered together in the confirmation process. Tobias, supra note 22, at 
2174-76. 
92. See Nomination Hearing, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (Nov. 15, 2017), 
https://www .judiciary. senate. gov/meetings/06/06/2018/nomina tions [hereinafter 
Nov. 15, 2017 Hearing]; Nomination Hearing, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 
(Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/08/08/2017 
/nominations (similarly packed); Aug. 1, 2018 Hearing, supra note 77 (hearing for 
one New York Second Circuit nominee and six New York district nominees). 
93. Members asked no questions. 163 CONG. REC. S8021-24 (daily ed. Dec. 
14, 2017) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (providing hearings for five circuit 
nominees in November, a month which included a one-week recess); sources cited 
supra note 92. Grassley continued this practice in 2018 by scheduling four 
similar hearings, one of which was unprecedented because the Chair scheduled 
it on October 24 after the Senate had recessed to campaign in the midterm 
elections. See Nomination Hearing, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (Mar. 21, 
2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/03/21/2018/nominations 
(hearing for Seventh Circuit nominees Amy St. Eve and Michael Scudder); 
Nomination Hearing, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (June 20, 2018), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/06/20/2018/nominations (hearing for 
Fourth Circuit nominees Julius Richardson and Marvin Quattlebaum). 
900 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53 
Courts" in their regions. 94 With most designees, numerous 
lawmakers had one five-minute round when they posed queries.95 
Some nominees did appear to pointedly stall by repeating many 
questions, while they deflected, evasively responded to queries, or 
dissembled.96 Illustrative of this was testimony of both Texas Fifth 
Circuit prospects.97 Another example was candidates' unwillingness 
to say whether, once appointed, they would recuse themselves in 
cases which addressed concepts-notably abortion, discrimination, or 
civil rights-that candidates had litigated while serving as counsel or 
about which the picks had explicitly stated clearly-held 
perspectives.98 Indeed, a third of Trump appointees did compile 
anti-LGBTQ records.99 These phenomena enabled hearings to 
devolve into seemingly meaningless exercises or farces in which 
nominal substantive material was exchanged. 
The resulting discussions that preceded Judiciary Committee 
approval of nominees similarly lacked important content and context. 
Members rarely engaged on substantive issues, even on matters 
which distinctly involved qualifications essential to public officials 
who hold unlimited tenure when resolving life and death questions.ioo 
One radical departure from regular order was Grassley's deleterious 
choice to not await completion of ABA evaluations and ratings before 
panel votes, despite continuous requests from Senator Dianne 
Feinstein (D-CA), the Ranking Member, to have votes after the ABA 
designee reports duly issued.101 Grassley vociferously responded that 
94. See 163 CONG. REC. 88021-24 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2017) (statements of 
Sen. Feinstein and Sen. Leahy); Mincberg, supra note 69 (rushing submission 
and review of nominee questionnaire answers); supra text accompanying note 53. 
95. See, e.g., Nomination Hearing, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMI'ITEE (June 14, 
201 7), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/06/14/201 7 /nominations 
[hereinafter June 14, 201 7 Hearing]. 
96. See id. 
97. Ho refused to discuss his memorandum on torture that the DOJ would 
not release, and Don Willett unresponsively answered many questions. Nov. 15, 
2017 Hearing, supra note 92; see 163 CONG. REC. S8021-24 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 
2017) (statements of Sens. Feinstein, Leahy, and Warren). But see 163 CONG. 
REC. S8025 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2017) (statement of Sen. Cornyn). 
98. See 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012) (recusal law); Nomination Hearing, SENATE 
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings 
/03/07/2018/nominations; Josh Gerstein, Trump-Appointed Judge Won't Recuse 
From Dossier Case, POLITICO (Feb. 16, 2018, 10:14 PM), https://www.politico.com 
/story/2018/02/16/trump-dossier-judge-recuse-416844; Joshi, supra note 46 
(describing judges' possible conflicts); Nomination Hearing, SENATE JUDICIARY 
COMMITTEE (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/11/29 
/2017/nominations; Nomination Hearing, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (June 
14, 2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/06/14/2017/nominations. 
99. Sources cited supra note 78. 
100. See, e.g., June 14, 2017 Hearing, supra note 95. 
101. Two of six district nominees lacked ABA ratings before the hearing and 
four district nominees' ratings were posted the day of the hearing. See Aug. 1, 
2018 Hearing, supra note 77; Executive Business Meeting, SENATE JUDICIARY 
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he could not allow this extra-governmental political group to dictate 
the Judiciary Committee schedule.102 It, accordingly, was 
unsurprising that many controversial nominees received party-line 
ballots.103 
After the Judiciary Committee marshaled approval of nominees 
who came to the floor, somewhat problematic, albeit less troubling, 
conduct by the Democrats complicated meaningful review of the 
attorneys nominated. Democrats insisted on cloture and roll call 
votes for myriad nominees, even well-qualified, mainstream 
individuals who felicitously won appointment.104 The GOP controlled 
the Senate fifty-two to forty-eight,105 and the 2013 ignition of the 
"nuclear option" meant that nominees won confirmation through 
majority vote.106 Especially problematic was the stacking of four 
appellate court nominees' debates and chamber votes over less than 
one week in 2017 after tendering last-minute notice and stacking six 
across one week in 2018 after proffering minimal notice. 107 The 
COMMI'ITEE (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/11/02 
/201 7 /executive-business-meeting. 
102. Michael Macagnone, DC Court Picks Face Panel Ahead of ABA Report, 
LAw360 (June 28, 2017, 4:35 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/939442/dc-
court-picks-face-senate-panel-ahead-of-aba-report; see Aug. 1, 2018 Hearing, 
supra note 77 (lacking ABA ratings before the hearing, and four district 
nominees' ratings were posted the day of the hearing for two of the six district 
nominees); see also Mincberg, supra note 69 (urging hearings after ABA reports); 
Tobias, supra note 37, at 13-14 (describing regular order). But see 163 CONG. 
REC. S8021-24 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2017) (statements of Sen. Feinstein and Leahy) 
(touting ABA input's value). For more on the influence of external political 
groups in judicial nominations and confirmations, see supra text accompanying 
notes 49-51 (assessing the role of the Federalist Society). 
103. See, e.g., Nomination Hearing, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMI'ITEE (Nov. 1, 
2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/11/0l/2017/nominations 
(approving Eighth Circuit nominee Grasz); Executive Business Meeting, SENATE 
JUDICIARY COMMI'ITEE (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings 
/02/15/2018/executive-business-meeting (approving Seventh Circuit nominee 
Michael Brennan). 
104. David B. Rivkin, Jr. & John Shu, The Senate's Unprecedented 
Obstruction, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 2, 2018, 6:48 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles 
/the-senates-unprecedented-obstruction-
1533250131 ?mod=searchresults&page= l&pos=l. 
105. See Alexander Burns & Jonathan Martin, Once a Long Shot, Democrat 
Doug Jones Wins Alabama Senate Race, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/us/politics/alabama-senate-race-
winner.html. 
106. 159 CONG. REC. S8418 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 2013) (describing the nuclear 
option); Carl Tobias, Filling the D.C. Circuit Vacancies, 91 IND. L.J. 121, 122 
(2015). 
107. Feinstein said that 2017 notice came on Thursday evening as senators 
were recessing for the week. Executive Business Meeting, SENATE JUDICIARY 
COMMI'ITEE (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/11/02 
/2017/executive-business-meeting; Schedule for Oct. 31, 2017, U.S. SENATE 
DEMOCRATS (Oct. 26, 2017, 7:40 PM), https://www.democrats.senate.gov/2017 
/10/30/schedule-for-tuesday-october-31-2017. For 2018, see Schedule for May 7, 
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immense quantity of candidates, their mammoth records, and the 
eleventh-hour notice clearly left Democrats, as the minority party, 
without sufficient resources to prepare.10s In fact, during Bush's eight 
years, the Senate never confirmed that many appellate court 
prospects over a single week; 109 across the corresponding period in 
Obama's tenure, this happened once because of a rare situation and 
with express GOP permission.no 
The quality of Senate final debates prior to nominee confirmation 
votes actually resembled that of Judiciary Committee candidate 
discussions; some were relatively less illuminating than the panel 
exchanges.111 The minority insisted on cloture ballots for nearly all 
candidates,u2 while much of the thirty hours allocated to debate 
following cloture addressed issues which were not related to specific 
choices and, even when particular senators discussed the picks, 
minuscule numbers of members heard the remarks.us Indeed, GOP 
legislators seemingly deemed the post cloture rule, which limits post-
cloture debate respecting district nominees to thirty hours, so 
unhelpful that they proposed shortening the proviso.114 
2018, U.S. SENATE DEMOCRATS (Apr. 26, 2018, 5:38 PM), 
https://www.democrats.senate.gov/2018/04/26/schedule-for-pro-formas-and-
monday-may-7-2018 [hereinafter Schedule for May 7, 2018]. 
108. Feinstein asserted these ideas. Compare Ruger, supra note 61, with 
Executive Business Meeting, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMI'ITEE (Nov. 2, 2017), 
https://www .judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/11102/201 7 /executive-business-
meeting. In 2018, the GOP stacked six circuit nominees in one week. Schedule 
for May 7, 2018, supra note 107. 
109. The most judges Bush confirmed in one week was three in late June 2004 
and four in early June 2005. See CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF AUTHORIZED 
JUDGESHIPS IN U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS, supra note 12. 
110. Obama appointed five judges in one late December 2010 week, as the 
Senate recessed at the Congress' end; they had languished a lengthy time 
awaiting final votes. Judicial Confirmations for January 2011, ADMIN. OFF. OF 
THE U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-
vacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies/2011/0l/confirmations/html (last visited 
Oct. 10, 2018). The most judges Obama appointed any other week was two. For 
more information, see CHRONOLOGICAL HISTORY OF AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS IN 
U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS, supra note 12. 
111. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text. 
112. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
113. Id. 
114. See Improving Procedures for the Consideration of Nominations in the 
Senate: Hearing on S. Res. 355, SENATE RULES COMMI'ITEE (Dec. 19, 2017), 
https://www.rules.senate.gov/hearings/hearing-to-review-s-res-355; Nomination 
Hearing, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMI'ITEE (Apr. 27, 2018), 
h ttps://www .judiciary.senate. gov/meetings/04/27/2018/nominations (approving 
the resolution); 163 CONG. REC. S7990 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 2017) (statement of Sen. 
Blunt); Alexander Bolton, Trump Presses GOP to Change Senate Rules, HILL 
(Mar. 18, 2018, 6:03 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/378882-trump-
presses-gop-to-change-senate-rules; Jordain Carney, McConnell Not Yet Ready 
To Change Rules for Trump Nominees, HILL (May 15, 2018, 4:16 PM), 
https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/38781 7-mcconnell-not-yet-ready-to-
change-rules-for-trump-nominees; Hulse, supra note 82. 
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The Republican chamber majority, similarly to the Trump 
Administration, prioritized circuit over district approvals, confirming 
nominees from states which Republican officers represent, appointing 
conservative white males and filling nonemergency federal court 
vacancies,115 although those parameters derived in significant 
measure from the nominating regime. These priorities directly 
enabled Trump to set the record for the most circuit judges approved 
in a president's first year,116 but the concepts left twenty-three district 
nominees without floor votes and substantial unoccupied district 
court positions at 2017's conclusion.117 These priorities also meant 
that paltry numbers of candidates realized appointments in 
jurisdictions that Democrats represent; only two minority nominees 
won confirmation, and emergencies drastically soared.118 The 
priorities concomitantly allowed Trump to shatter the record for most 
appellate jurists appointed in a president's second year, but these 
priorities will restrict the number of district nominees confirmed and 
increase district court vacancies at 2018's close. Moreover, these 
priorities indicate that small numbers of nominees will receive 
confirmations in states Democrats represent, comparatively few 
minority nominees will secure confirmation, and emergencies will 
remain extremely high.119 
C. Explanations for Nomination and Confirmation Problems 
The reasons why many concerns plagued the nomination and 
confirmation systems are difficult to precisely identify, mainly 
because the Executive Branch and the Senate furnish rather limited 
information about nominations and confirmations.120 However, some 
explanations may be gleaned from the descriptive rendition detailed 
already. 
Perhaps the leading reason for complications involving nominees 
was that the Trump Administration overemphasized circuit 
appointments of many conservatives to the near exclusion of multiple 
other important actions, notably district nominations and 
confirmations. Trump emphatically and clearly admonished McGahn 
to stress circuit vacancies, while the Trump Administration 
powerfully invoked Federalist Society recommendations, even if the 
White House did not fully outsource recruitment to this external 
political group.121 
115. See supra notes 44-53 and accompanying text. 
116. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. 
117. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. 
118. Executive Calendar, U.S. SENATE (Dec. 23, 2017), https://www.senate.gov 
/legislative/LIS/executive_calendar/2017112_23_2017.pdf; supra notes 71-80 and 
accompanying text. 
119. See Carney, supra note 5; see also Judicial Vacancies, supra note 71. 
120. See Tobias, supra note 38, at 1107 (explaining that participants' privacy 
needs may justify limited information). 
121. See, e.g., supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text. 
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The Trump Administration concomitantly appeared to 
deemphasize (1) empty trial court posts and leave much responsibility 
for the nominations to home-state politicians, (2) copious openings in 
jurisdictions with Democratic senators, (3) minority representation, 
and ( 4) emergency vacancies in numbers of circuits and districts.122 
The focus on circuit and conservative candidates can partly explain 
the insignificant attention these aspects received. This inattention 
was unwarranted, because district jurists comprise the federal bench 
"workhorses" and finally resolve most cases.123 Moreover, Senators' 
party affiliation should clearly not dictate the allocation of court 
judicial resources, and correspondingly, justice's quality. Minority 
jurists also provide numerous distinct benefits, and the emergency 
vacancy classification applies in the worst-case scenarios.124 The 
appellate court emphasis may also reveal why certain district 
nominees plainly lacked the requisite qualifications:125 the DOJ and 
the White House Counsel deployed insufficiently rigorous screening 
procedures and devoted comparatively minimal resources to scrutiny 
of prospects, while they disregarded ABA ratings before and even 
subsequent to nominations.126 
In fairness, Trump had never served in the public sector or run 
for office.127 He campaigned on a platform to "drain the swamp" and 
radically disrupt the political status quo, crucial elements that the 
President's unorthodox management style and chaotic White House 
infighting putatively worsened.128 Trump had little appreciation for 
courts and the selection process, phenomena evidenced by (1) 
122. See id. 
123. ALICIA BANNON, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., FEDERAL JUDICIAL VACANCIES: 
THE TRIAL COURTS 1-5 (2013), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files 
/publications/Judicial%20Vacancies%20Report%20Final. pdf (describing the 
work load of district courts). 
124. See sources cited supra notes 71-73, 75-76, infra notes 147-50. 
125. See sources cited supra notes 68--69. 
126. Id.; see sources cited supra notes 63--B5 (indicating circuit nominee was 
found not qualified through an ABA rating); sources cited supra notes 101-102. 
For DOJ and White House Counsel deficiencies, see, for example, supra notes 47-
48 and accompanying text. 
127. See, e.g., Zachary Crockett, Donald Trump Is the Only US President Ever 
with No Political or Military Experience, Vox (Jan. 23, 2017, 10:07 AM), 
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2016/11/11/13587532/donald-trump-no-
experience. 
128. See generally DAVID FRUM, TRUMPOCRACY (2018); BOB WOODWARD, FEAR: 
TRUMP IN THE WHITE HOUSE (2018) (discussing the chaotic and disruptive nature 
of President Trumps' campaign and management style); MICHAEL WOOLF, FIRE 
AND FURY (2018). For more on the campaign, see Mark Landler & Julie 
Hirschfeld Davis, President Unbound, Aides Bewildered, Capital Reeling, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 24, 2018, at Al; Ashley Parker et al., Trump Chooses Impulse Over 
Strategy as Crises Mount, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-chooses-impulse-over-strategy-
as-crises-mount/2018/04/11/884e33c2-3d9d-1le8-974f-aacd97698cef_story.html 
?utm_term=.8a0edc6cf425 (representing the fact that newspapers have covered 
President Trump's disruptive style since 2017). 
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scathing criticisms of judges who issued opinions which thwarted his 
political efforts,129 and (2) concerted attempts to confirm numerous 
jurists who might reliably sustain presidential initiatives, such as 
banning extensive numbers of immigrants from the country and 
comprehensively dismantling the modern administrative state.130 
Those parameters were exacerbated by the compelling necessity to 
speedily fill the prolonged Supreme Court opening which resulted 
from Justice Antonin Scalia's passing and the 105 unoccupied lower 
court seats upon Trump's inauguration, each of which Mitch 
McConnell (KY), the Republican Majority Leader, aggressively 
orchestrated.131 
Considerable analogous concerns-in particular the apparently 
crucial need to foster the swift appointment of many conservative 
appellate court judges--explain the numerous difficulties in the 
confirmation process, yet Republicans had been the Senate majority 
party for two years.132 At the committee level, the deviation from 
traditional blue slip procedure exemplifies these problems. In 
Grassley's seeming haste to quickly process the maximum number of 
conservative appellate courtjurists,133 the Chair undermined the blue 
slip mechanism which had long functioned extremely well. Grassley 
created an exception for circuit nominees by arrogating to the Chair 
significant discretion for ascertaining judicial candidate 
qualifications on a case-specific basis, without objective criteria, 
including whether the White House had adequately consulted 
politicians in home states.134 This reasoning lacks persuasive 
support, as both parties concur that appellate court openings remain 
129. In His Own Words: The President's Attacks on the Courts, BRENNAN CTR. 
FOR JUST. (June 5, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/his-own-
words-presidents-attacks-courts. 
130. See generally Gillian Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State 
Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017); Jennifer Bendery, Trump Has No Idea 
Why He Gets to Fill So Many Court Seats, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 29, 2018, 8:56 
PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump-federal-judges-obama-
republicans_us_5abd47c4e4b0a47437a98594; see 163 CONG. REC. S8021-24 
(daily ed. Dec. 14, 2017) (statements of Sens. Leahy, Feinstein, and Warren); 
Peters, supra note 48; Rucker et al., supra note 47; Tillman, supra note 50. 
131. See Tessa Berenson, 'We'd Like to See America Right of Center:' Mitch 
McConnell Explains His Judge Strategy, TIME (Feb. 8, 2018), 
http://time.com/513824 7 /mitch-mcconnell-judicial-strategy/; Amber Phillips, 
Why Mitch McConnell Is Bragging About Holding Up Merrick Garland From the 
Supreme Court, Two Years Later, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2018) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/04/05/why-mitch-
mcconnell-is-bragging-about-holding-up-merrick-garland-from-the-supreme-
court-two-years-later/; see also MITCH McCONNELL, THE LONG GAME (2015); 
Hulse, supra note 82; Rucker et al., supra note 47; see generally Tobias, supra 
note 37. 
132. Party Division, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/history 
/partydiv.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
133. See supra Part III.B. 
134. See supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text. 
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more critical because circuit judges are fewer, their opinions cover 
several jurisdictions and consistently enunciate greater policy, and 
lawmakers continually insist on assigning nearly every appellate 
vacancy to the identical state where openings arise.135 
Related, but probably somewhat less concerning, was the 
extremely hurried arrangement of committee hearings, discussions, 
and votes, which could similarly have been motivated by the 
perceived necessity to rapidly approve myriad conservative appeals 
court jurists.136 Analogous ideas can apply to the Chair's eschewing 
dependence on ABA nominee ratings ahead of committee votes and 
the Majority Leader's conscious determination to stack floor ballots 
on appellate court picks.137 Nonetheless, GOP members' abject 
failure in 2017 to cast neither one negative panel vote against any 
prospect nor more than one no floor ballot138 suggests that the 
propositions surveyed in this paragraph enjoy less crucial importance 
than Grassley's blue slip modification and rushed chamber treatment 
generally. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
The nomination and confirmation processes' descriptive 
examination above reveals that the constructs which the Trump 
White House and the 115th Senate use have multiple detrimental 
ramifications. One trenchant yardstick is the current thirteen 
appellate court and 115 district court unfilled positions, sixty-eight 
constituting emergencies.139 Many of these unfilled positions arose 
from jurisdictions that Democrats primarily represent, 140 and a 
stunning paucity of nominees comprise minority individuals.141 The 
numbers are worse than the 105 vacant slots, forty-two consisting of 
135. Executive Business Meeting, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (Feb. 15, 
2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/02/15/2018/executive-
business-meeting (statements of Sens. Crapo, Feinstein and Leahy); see Tobias, 
supra note 22, at 2171-74 (discussing seat assignments); infra note 191 and 
accompanying text. 
136. See supra notes 90-100 and accompanying text. Hearings, discussions, 
and votes do warrant improvement. 
137. See sources cited supra notes 101, 107-110. The panel needs ABA input 
before the committee members discuss nominees and vote, and the chamber 
requires decreased stacking before senators debate and vote. 
138. Much Republican, and considerable Democratic, lockstep voting suggest 
that better procedures may not improve the confirmation process or the vacancy 
crisis. See 163 CONG. REC. S7351 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 2017) (Sen. Kennedy's sole 
negative GOP floor vote); supra note 103 and accompanying text (no negative 
GOP panel vote). 
139. See Archive of Judicial Vacancies, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-judicial-
vacancies (last updated Oct. 2018) (providing archival data on judicial vacancies, 
judicial emergencies, and confirmation listings). 
140. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text. 
141. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text. 
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emergencies, upon the Trump Administration's inception, even while 
present active jurists' motivation to assume senior status or retire is 
purportedly slowing.142 
The judicial openings' significant quantity-large percentages of 
which constitute emergencies--clustered at the trial court level and 
in states represented by Democrats, conjoined with their protracted 
nature and minorities' confined representation among nominees, 
creates troubling consequences. The statistics enhance pressure on 
sitting district judges to promptly, inexpensively, and equitably 
resolve civil and criminal suits.143 Trial level jurists comprise the 
justice regime's workhorses and finally decide most civil lawsuits and 
criminal prosecutions, which receive precedence under the Speedy 
Trial Act. 144 Yet numerous prolonged empty seats undercut minority 
party home-state politicians who can receive blame for the openings 
and deprive their constituents of judicial resources.145 
Certain factors-including the numerous circuit and district 
vacancies, striking emergencies, and few minority confirmees and 
nominees-accentuate the critical need to fill more openings with 
diverse jurists. The Trump Administration's neglect of minority, 
female, and LGBTQ representation has problematic impacts. The 
federal courts have been an emblematic locus for justice where 
individuals of color, particularly African Americans, Latinos, and 
Native Americans, experience significant overrepresentation in the 
criminal justice process, and minorities, women, and LGBTQ 
individuals correspondingly encounter too little judicial 
representation.146 This inattention to diversity's expansion 
142. See Russell Wheeler, Trump's 1st State of the Union: Is He Really 
Reshaping the Federal Judiciary?, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 25, 2018), 
https ://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2018/01/2 5/trum ps- lst-sta te-of- the-
union -is-he-really-reshaping-the-federal-judiciary/; Tillman, supra note 70; 
supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
143. FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see Patrick Johnston, Problems in Raising Prayers to 
the Level of Rule: The Example of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, 75 B.U. L. 
REV. 1325, 1325 (1995). 
144. Joe Palazzolo, In Federal Courts, the Civil Cases Pile Up, WALL ST. J. 
(Apr. 6, 2015, 2:09 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-federal-courts-civil-
cases-pile-up-1428343 7 46. 
145. Id.; Kevin Diaz, Senate Approves Federal Judge Growing Backlog Eased 
Slightly, Hous. CHRON. (Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.houstonchronicle.com 
/archive/search/. See John R. Emshwiller & Gary Fields, As Criminal Laws 
Proliferate, More Are Ensnared, WALL ST. J. (July 23, 2011), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles 
/SB10001424052748703749504576172714184601654 (stating that criminal 
prosecutions now often address matters that should be treated in the civil justice 
system but that many civil dockets are already backlogged). 
146. See Theresa M. Beiner, The Elusive (But Worthwhile) Quest for a Diverse 
Bench in the New Millennium, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 597, 599 (2003); see, e.g., 
Inmate Ethnicity, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics 
/statistics_inmate_ethnicity.jsp Oast updated Oct. 27, 2018); Inmate Race, FED. 
BUREAU OF PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate 
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constitutes a lost opportunity for increasing the quality of justice that 
litigants need. 
Greater minority representation offers numerous special 
advantages. People of color, women, and LGBTQ jurists carefully 
supply efficacious, nuanced "outsider" perspectivesl47 as well as 
different, constructive insights about crucial questions respecting 
abortion, criminal law, employment discrimination, and other 
complex issues which federal judges resolve. 148 They also curtail 
ethnic, gender, and sexual orientation biases that directly undermine 
justice.149 Moreover, jurists who resemble the nation instill public 
confidence by strongly demonstrating that abundant persons of color, 
women, and LGBTQ candidates serve productively as judges, and 
minority judges may be especially sensitive to the circumstances that 
lead numbers of minorities to appear in federal court.150 
A few reasons for not addressing diversity, which might have 
possessed surface plausibility before, seem unconvincing today. For 
example, the conservative, able people of color, women, and LGBTQ 
individuals-including Trump confirmees Thapar, Ho, Nalbandian, 
Scholer, Rodriguez, Otake, and Moorer combined with nominees 
Alston, Arias-Marxuach, Gujarati, Pacold, Ranjan, Ruiz, Smith, 
Younge, and Row land--dynamically refute the condescending notions 
that appointing considerable minority, female, and LGBTQ nominees 
_race.jsp (last updated Oct. 27, 2018); Demography of Article III Judges, 1789-
2017, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/exhibits/graphs-and-maps/race-
and-ethnicity (last visited Sept. 29, 2018); Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table!US/PST045217 (last visited Sept. 
29, 2018) (providing statistics for all states, counties, and cities with a population 
of five thousand or more). These charts in particular show that the number of 
minority inmates far exceeds the percentage of the population those minorities 
occupy. Conversely, the number of minorities in federal judicial positions is far 
below the percentage of the population that minorities occupy. 
147. John McCain & Jeff Flake, Federal Judge Diane Humetewa, 40 HUM. 
RTS. 22, 22 (2015); see Beiner, supra note 146, at 610-17. 
148. See generally Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender 
and Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L.J. 1759 
(2005) (discussing voting preferences of female judges on Title VII sex 
discrimination and sexual harassment claims along with how female judges 
influence male judges on these types of gender-coded cases). But see generally 
Stephen Choi et al., Judging Women, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 504 (2011) 
(arguing that there are not significant gender differences in decision-making). 
149. See, e.g., NINTH CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON RACIAL, RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC 
FAIRNESS, FINAL REPORT 7-14 (1997); FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE 
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 169 (1990). 
150. Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Only Skin Deep?: The Cost of Partisan Politics 
on Minority Diversity of the Federal Bench, 83 IND. L.J. 1423, 1442 (2008); Jeffrey 
Toobin, The Obama Brief, NEW YORKER, Oct. 27, 2014, at 24 (discussing the 
judicial legacy of President Obama and focusing in part on how the majority of 
his appointments ''have been women and non-white males"). For more 
background on this discussion, see generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: 
CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET (1999) (providing an analysis of the 
legal issues surrounding gender and sexual nonconformity in the United States). 
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will erode merit because the pool is small or the United States lacks 
enough conservative attorneys.151 The persons of color, women, and 
LGBTQ individuals nominated and confirmed to date show that 
Trump has copious readily available putative nominees, who do 
simultaneously provide merit and conservative views. The Trump 
Administration need only capitalize on this salutary potential. 
Presidential fulfillment of constitutional duties to nominate and 
confirm accomplished judges for the myriad vacancies may be 
undercut by the White House's abbreviated consultation with home-
state politicians, limited transparency and rigor in considering 
selections, exclusion of ABA investigations and other effective 
concepts, dependence on truncated or inefficacious measures, and 
penchant for stressing rapid nominations and confirmations of ample 
conservative appellate court jurists.152 The Senate's concomitant 
proclivity to quickly approve numerous similar jurists-particularly 
through modifying blue slips; eschewing or constricting additional 
helpful practices, such as probing nominee questioning in committee 
hearings; and correspondingly rubberstamping Trump 
Administration candidates-might analogously undermine senators' 
discharge of constitutional responsibilities to advise and consent. 
Vacancies' enormous number and protracted character may also 
distinctly impair the federal judiciary's efforts to realize its 
constitutional duty for swiftly, economically, and fairly resolving 
cases by imposing excessive pressure on jurists and slowing litigation 
dispositions. 153 When the circuit and district courts lack the judicial 
resources which are necessary to deliver justice for lengthy periods, 
this situation can have abundant corrosive impacts.154 Constant, 
express overemphasis on ideology when appointing jurists could 
make the bench resemble the President and Congress. The judges 
who secure nomination and confirmation through overtly politicized 
and staunchly partisan nomination and confirmation processes might 
concomitantly seem very political and supremely partisan, which may 
undercut public confidence in the judiciary.155 
151. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. Trump confirmed many 
other able, conservative women, including Seventh Circuit Judge Amy Coney 
Barrett and Sixth Circuit Judge Joan Larsen. 163 CONG. REC. S6908 (daily ed. 
Oct. 31, 2017) (debate on confirmation of Barrett); 163 CONG. REC. S6944 (daily 
ed. Nov. 1, 2017) (debate on confirmation of Larsen); Press Release, Office of the 
Press Sec'y, President Donald Trump Announces Judicial Nominees (May 8, 
201 7), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/nine-nominations-sent-
senate-today-2/. 
152. Matthew Madden, Anticipated Judicial Vacancies and the Power To 
Nominate, 93 VA. L. REV. 1135, 1139, 1145 (2007). 
153. Bruce Moyer, Vacancy Signs at the Federal Courthouse, 57 FED. LAw. 8, 
8 (2010). 
154. See id.; see also Comm. on Fed. Cts., supra note 8, at 374; Tobias, supra 
note 15, at 769, 770, 795. 
155. Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, The New Oral Argument: Justices as 
Advocates, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2019); Sen. Orrin Hatch, Protect 
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The termination or erosion of a few customs, notably 
administration consultation and blue slips, can mean that the 
institutions of the presidency, the Senate and perhaps the judiciary 
could be experiencing decline, as those conventions are the "glue" that 
solidifies the institutions.156 Finally, the concerns analyzed can erode 
citizen respect for, and trust in, the coequal branches, which 
epitomize American democracy. 
In sum, President Trump has earned success in recommending 
circuit and district court possibilities, while his administration set the 
record for confirming appeals court nominees, most of whom are very 
conservative and prominent, since taking office. Nevertheless, the 
White House eliminated, modified or deemphasized constructive 
ideas which formerly promoted excellent judicial nominations and 
confirmations, and the U.S. confronts considerably larger openings 
than upon Trump's inauguration. Therefore, the last part reviews 
strictures which promise to improve selection. 
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The assessment of the confirmation and nomination processes' 
modern state demonstrates that plentiful features clearly necessitate 
remediation and some could deserve amelioration, even while other 
concepts implemented have performed reasonably well. Thus, this 
section proffers many short- and longer-term proposals which should 
help treat the vacancy crisis by enhancing the nomination and 
confirmation procedures. 
A. Short-Term Suggestions 
The Trump Administration must capitalize on numerous 
solutions that have proved useful before. Trump's White House 
astutely deploys a few of these solutions. One reliable approach is the 
elevation to appellate courts of impressive, mainstream district 
appointees whom the chief executive's predecessors, specifically 
Presidents Bush and Obama, confirmed.157 This avenue is venerable, 
because the nommees suggested have compiled accessible, 
comprehensive records and offer consummate distinguished 
applicable experience, while the chamber has already canvassed and 
the Senate's Important 'Advice and Consent' Role, HILL (Apr. 11, 2014, 8:00 AM), 
http ://thehill.corn/ opinion/op-ed/203226-protect-the-senates-important-advice-
and-consent-role; Marcus, supra note 38; Savage, supra note 49. That may even 
erode citizen trust in judicial decision-making. 
156. See 163 CONG. REC. S8021-24 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2017) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy); 163 CONG. REC. 88042 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2017) (statement of Sen. 
Durbin); Ruger, supra note 59. 
157. Elisha Carol Savchak et al., Taking It to the Next Level: The Elevation of 
District Court Judges to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 478, 479 
(2006). 
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confirmed them once.158 Illustrations are Bush choices, Judges Amul 
Thapar, Ralph Erickson, and Amy St. Eve, whom Trump placed on 
appeals courts, and jurists Obama confirmed, Judge Diane 
Humetewa, who may become the first Native American circuit jurist, 
and Judge Manesh Shah, who could be the first Asian American 
proffered for the Seventh Circuit.159 
A related pragmatic technique would be nominating again more 
of the twenty excellent, conservative, and moderate Obama district 
nominees who received Judiciary Committee hearings and approval 
without dissent but lacked final votes.160 This construct would 
markedly expedite appointments, because renamed nominees in fact 
must only capture panel and floor ballots.161 Trump has depended on 
renomination with fourteen Obama designees, including Karen Gren 
Scholer, five of whom attained confirmation;162 however, there are 
multiple other candidates, encompassing Inga Bernstein, Julien 
Neals, and Florence Pan, who can supplement minority 
representation or directly fill numbers of prolonged empty 
judgeships.163 
The President must also consider instituting, emphasizing, 
revitalizing, or improving numerous effective actions, which Trump 
has downplayed or rejected. One major concept would be assiduously 
consulting home-state politicians about nominees, which is a leading 
justification for the blue slip policy.164 Meticulous consultation with 
the senators, especially political figures who deploy bipartisan 
selection panels to recommend strong individuals, promotes smooth 
nominations and confirmations.165 A peculiarly telling example of 
158. Id.; Tobias, supra note 47, at 2248. 
159. Diversity on the Bench, FED. Jun. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/node/7491 
(last visited Oct. 4, 2018). Many others, such as District Judges Philip Gutierrez 
and Lucy Koh, exist. Carl Tobias, Combating the Ninth Circuit Judicial Vacancy 
Crisis, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 687, 715-18 (2017). Bush named 
Gutierrez; Obama tapped Koh. 
160. They were not confirmed because the GOP refused to conduct votes. 
Tobias, supra note 31, at 18-19. 
161. The twenty enjoyed panel hearings and approvals with no dissents in 
2015-16. Id. 
162. The five are Karen Gren Scholer, David Nye, Scott Palk, Donald Coggins 
and Walter Counts. See 164 CONG. REC. Sl333 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 2018) 
(confirming Scholer); Tobias, supra note 31, at 21-23. 
163. See Carl Tobias, Why Trump Should Renominate Inga Bernstein for the 
District of Massachusetts, HILL (July 5, 2017, 5:20 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs 
/pundits-blog/the-judiciary/340734-why-trump-should-renominate-inga-
bernstein-for-the-district; Carl Tobias, Confirm Florence Pan for D.C. District 
Court, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/all-
opinions-are-local/wp/2016/11121/confirm-florence- pan -for-d-c-district-court 
/?utm_term=.4d670274adea; Carl Tobias, Confirm Julien Neals for the District of 
New Jersey, HILL (Aug. 25, 2016, 12:08 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-
blog/judicial/29253 9-confirm-julien -neals-for-the-district-of-new-jersey. 
164. See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text. 
165. Ruger, supra note 59. 
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this mechanism's value was the nomination of two able, conservative 
Illinois Seventh Circuit picks, Amy St. Eve and Michael Scudder, 
whom both Democratic senators powerfully favored and the chamber 
easily approved, ideas evinced by their rapidly scheduled, 
uncontroversial panel hearing, committee discussion and vote, and 
floor debate and confirmation ballot.166 In short, much efficacious 
consultation will not always yield the parties' first choices, but it 
would facilitate the vast majority of nominations and cautiously treat 
stalemates, like those which developed in Oregon and Wisconsin, that 
can erode the process and interparty trust.167 
The Executive should correspondingly reconsider its mistaken 
decision to exclude the ABA from official responsibility for designee 
investigations and concomitant ratings, because presidents since the 
1950s, except George W .. Bush and Donald Trump, did carefully 
invoke the Bar Association's consummate expertise, massive network 
of incisive evaluators, and cogent, instructive reports.168 Moreover, 
dependence on ABA examinations and rankings in candidates' 
prenomination analyses could minimize the embarrassment imposed 
on Trump submissions who drew "not qualified" ratings.169 The 
eventual appointment of most prospects who garnered this distinctive 
ranking can also suggest that ABA input could professionally alert 
selection participants to supposed problems with nominees.110 Even 
166. Cooperation regarding Judges St. Eve and Scudder attended Mark 
Bennett's choice for a Hawaii Ninth Circuit vacancy. Executive Business Meeting, 
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMJTTEE (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov 
/meetings/committee-executive-business-meeting (St. Eve and Scudder panel 
approvals); Nomination Hearing, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (Mar. 21, 2018), 
https ://www .judiciary .senate. gov/meetings/03/21/2018/nomina tions (statements 
of Sens. Durbin and Grassley) (stating that White House Counsel carefully 
consulted senators and Sen. Grassley quickly set a panel hearing); 164 CONG. 
REC. S2655 (daily ed. May 14, 2018) (St. Eve & Scudder confirmations); Press 
Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Donald J. Trump Nominates His 
Eleventh Wave of Judicial Nominees (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov 
/presiden tial-actions/presiden t-donald-j-trump-announces-eleventh-wave-
judicial-nominees/. For Bennett's quickly-set and rather similarly 
uncontroversial hearing, panel discussion, approval, floor debate, and vote, see 
Executive Business Meeting, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (May 10, 2018), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/05/10/2018/executive-business-
meeting; Nomination Hearing, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMJTTEE (Apr. 11, 2018), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/04/11/2018/nominations-1; 164 CONG. 
REC. S4858 (daily ed. July 10, 2018) (Bennett's confirmation). 
167. See supra notes 55, 58-59, 84-86 and accompanying text. Similar 
disputes arose in Ohio, Washington, and New Jersey. See Kaplan, supra note 54; 
sources cited supra note 87. 
168. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. But see also sources cited 
supra note 64. 
169. See sources cited supra note 68. The President can decline to nominate 
or the candidate may withdraw privately. 
1 70. See sources cited supra note 64. When the ABA rated Charles Goodwin 
and Holly Teeter not qualified, chief judges where each was nominated voiced 
strong support. Executive Business Meeting, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE (Jan 
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should Trump insist on eschewing a formal ABA role, his White 
House Counsel must allow certain picks and some nominees to 
cooperate with the Bar Association, which diligently conducts 
investigations and prepares ratings on designees. 171 
The White House should correspondingly revisit its 
determination to accelerate the nomination and confirmation of 
conservative appellate judges. For example, it might adopt a regime 
centered on the needs of all circuit and district courts. One estimable 
approach may be prioritizing nominations by initially sending 
prospects who reduce the sixty-three emergency vacancies.172 The 
President can stress the 115 trial level openings and the many courts 
with large vacancy percentages and cohorts, including certain 
districts in Texas and particular courts across California and in New 
York.173 Emphasizing the latter states considerably more, and 
related jurisdictions, notably Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, and 
Pennsylvania, might concomitantly address the lack of nominees 
from states represented by Democrats.174 The White House Counsel 
ought to effectuate this by affording home-state congressional 
members greater responsibility for detecting, recruiting, and 
proposing superb candidates whom Trump names.175 If the Trump 
Administration persistently stresses appellate courts, the President 
should at least target emergency circuit openings. 
President Trump as well must implement practices that will 
further bench diversity because pronounced minority representation 
18, 2018), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/01/18/2018/executive-
business-meeting (Teeter); Nomination Hearing, SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 
(Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/12/13/2017 
/nominations (Goodwin); 164 CONG. REC. S5590 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2018) (Teeter 
confirmation); 164 CONG. REC. S5981 (daily ed. Aug. 28, 2018) (Goodwin 
confirmation); Peter Hancock, Senate Panel Advances Johnson County Attorney 
for Federal Judgeship in Kansas, LAWRENCE J. WORLD (Nov. 9, 2017, 12:46 PM), 
http://www2.ljworld.com/news/201 7 /nov/09/ senate-panel-advances-teeter-
federal-judgeship-kan/; Justin Wingerter, Oklahoma City Federal Judge Defends 
His Work Ethic Before Senate Committee, OKLAHOMAN (Dec. 13, 2017, 5:15 PM), 
https://newsok.com/ article/ 55 7 5 779/oklahoma -city-federal-judge-defends-his-
wor k-ethic-before-senate-committee. 
171. See sources cited supra note 65. 
172. See sources cited supra notes 71-73, 75-77, 142-43. 
173. See sources cited supra notes 71-73, 75-77, 124, 142-43. Florida and 
Pennsylvania have ten vacancies and split delegations. See Press Release, Office 
of the Press Sec'y, President Donald J. Trump Announces Thirteenth Wave of 
Judicial Nominees and Seventh Wave of United States Marshal Nominees (Apr. 
26, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/president-donald-j-
trump-announces-thirteenth-wave-judicial-nominees-seventh-wave-united-
states-marshal-nominees/ (sending five Florida district nominees). 
174. See 28 U.S.C. § 133 (2012); see also supra notes 77, 140 and 
accompanying text. States, like Nebraska and Idaho, with few authorized judges, 
also deserve emphasis, as one vacancy can be a high percentage. 
175. The White House has apparently deferred significantly to many 
home-state politicians, especially on district vacancies. See supra notes 66--67 
and accompanying text. 
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could furnish numerous benefits.176 The Executive should accord 
diversity high priority while communicating to all involved with court 
selection and the public that Trump believes expanding minority 
representation has importance. The White House Counsel needs to 
spearhead this endeavor by actively conveying the message that 
increasing diversity is a critical priority analogous to conservatism. 
This message can be implemented by his staff, the DOJ, the Judiciary 
Committee, and politicians from jurisdictions that do encounter 
openings. 
The White House Counsel should prescribe full recommendations 
to accentuate diversity. For instance, White House Counsel 
employees and others who collaborate on appointments now ought to 
include minorities while committing enough resources to foster 
smooth discharge of the responsibility for increasing diversity. Every 
participant in the nomination process must recruit, identify, 
evaluate, and submit numerous qualified people of color, women, and 
LGBTQ designees by contacting individuals and organizations that 
have familiarity with those groups. The White House Counsel should 
persuade officers from all states with current vacancies to pinpoint 
and forward capable minorities. The counsel then necessarily must 
scrutinize, interview, and p·roffer these choices, asking that Trump 
seriously examine the named individuals. The President may lead by 
example with consequent nominations, urging lawmakers to support 
and promptly consider them. 
In short, Trump and the chamber must thoroughly explore plenty 
of near-term solutions that would improve the processes for selecting 
and confirming judges. The President might assertively consult 
home-state legislators and restore ABA participation from which 
numerous chief executives, senators, jurists, and other parties. The 
Senate may correspondingly revive salient procedures, namely blue 
slips' delivery and complete, rigorous hearings and floor debates. 
B. Longer-Term Suggestions 
The review conducted above demonstrates the confirmation wars 
that preceded Trump's ascension have insistently continued since his 
election, illuminated by the minority party's rare agreements on 
chamber votes and the majority party's extension of the nuclear 
option to Supreme Court nominees.177 Many phenomena indicate 
that 2018 is past time for seriously contemplating activities that can 
permanently enhance the atrophied selection practices: the small 
176. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text. 
177. See also John Gramlich, Federal Judicial Picks Have Become More 
Contentious, and Trump's Are No Exception, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 7, 2018), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/07 /federal-judicial-picks-have-
become-more-contentious-and-trumps-are-no-exception; Tobias, supra note 38, 
at 1107, n.81. For additional discussion, see supra notes 104--06, 112, 115 and 
accompanying text. 
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number of confirmations during Obama's final two years, the 
selection process' downward spiral manifested by unproductive 
paybacks and strident partisanship-which culminated in GOP 
refusal to assess Judge Garland-the sharply limited coordination 
between the parties so early in Trump's presidency, and the 
seemingly dismal prospects for rectifying the resulting 
complications.178 
The Trump Administration's omission, change, or de-emphasis of 
numerous appointment constructs, which had functioned rather 
effectively, is significantly accelerating the procedures' steady 
decline. Yet, 2018 was a promising season to initiate longer-term 
reforms. As a midterm election year-Democrats and Republicans 
were unsure which party would win the Senate in November 2018, 
and they remain uncertain which party will capture the presidency 
come 2020. Thus, 2018 was replete with uncertainties and 
opportunities for compromise. Accordingly, 2018 could have been a 
very auspicious period for instituting several longer-term practices 
when both parties should have favored permanent solutions, while 
the President and the Senate needed to honor essential constitutional 
appointment duties with meaningful cooperation.179 The best time 
for adopting solutions was prior to the midterm elections because 
uncertainty about the outcomes provided greater incentives to reach 
agreement;180 however, some consensus may be possible in a lame 
duck session or even in early 2019 and certainly in the 2020 
presidential election year. 
Trump and senators can agree to dramatically change the 
present system through introduction of a bipartisan judiciary that 
would allow the party without executive control to recommend some 
percentage of nominees.181 Members of Congress from specific 
jurisdictions have implemented relatively analogous constructs over 
various times. New York lawmakers adopted a concept that enabled 
an official whose party did not control the White House to submit one 
in a few district nominees,182 and this measure worked efficaciously 
178. See supra text accompanying notes 37-41, 57-58, 121. 
179. For many longer-term ideas that could help conclude or at least 
ameliorate the confirmation wars, see generally Michael Shenkman, Decoupling 
District from Circuit Judge Nominations: A Proposal to Put Trial Bench 
Confirmations on Track, 65 ARK. L. REV. 217, 298-311 (2012); Tobias, supra note 
47, at 2255-65. 
180. See Carl Tobias, Firing the Federal Judicial Selection Process, 65 EMORY 
L.J. ONLINE 2051, 2057-58, 2058 n.42 (2016), http://law.emory.edu/elj 
/_documents/volumes/65/online/tobias.pdf (arguing that the period before the 
2016 election was an opportune time for reform of the judicial selection process 
because neither party could guarantee that it would be able to take advantage). 
181. Michael J. Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as War, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
667, 688 (2003); Tobias, supra note 15, at 790 n.124. 
182. JOAN BISKUPIC, BREAKING IN: THE RISE OF SONIA SOTOMAYOR AND THE 
POLITICS OF JUSTICE 59 (2014). The allocation for the senator not of the same 
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from the 1970s until the 1990s.183 Pennsylvania is a modern example. 
Senators Bob Casey (D) and Pat Toomey (R) now rely on bipartisan 
merit-selection panels, which have canvassed and chosen individuals 
since 2011,184 and the legislator whose party does not control the 
administration might stipulate one in four trial court nominees.185 
Florida's Marco Rubio (R) and Bill Nelson (D) have deployed 
comparatively analogous commissions to propose suggestions.186 
Varying requirements within the jurisdictions would encourage 
negotiation between senators and the President.187 Central strictures 
should include the percentages of submissions the opposition party 
affords, the number it could muster for every opening, and whether 
designees need to be ranked.188 In split delegations, relevant 
concerns are whether the Democrats, the Republicans, or the 
President will initially delineate favorites and how to cautiously 
resolve differences between the senators and the President. A 
salutary approach could include having the lawmakers agree while 
proffering one candidate at a time until the executive concurs, as the 
solution reflects constitutional language and contemporary 
practice.189 
Another issue may be ·which tribunals should have eligibility. 
For instance, a number of courts, particularly the D.C. District, might 
party as the President was at first one in four but later became one in three. See 
id.; see also 143 CONG. REC. 4254 (1997). 
183. See Kline, supra note 23, at 299 n.161. 
184. Press Release, Senator Pat Toomey, Senators Casey and Toomey 
Continue Bipartisan Agreement on District Court Vacancies (Mar. 10, 2017), 
https://www.toomey.senate.gov/?p=news&id=l896. 
185. Lisa Thompson, Candidate Recommended for Erie Federal Judge Post, 
GoERIE (June 14, 2015, 12:01 AM), http://www.goerie.com/news/20150614 
/candidate-recommended-for-erie-federal-judge-post. Illinois used a similar 
system when the delegation was split, and the two Democrats retain that regime. 
Press Release, Senator Dick Durbin, White House Nominates Two to Fill Federal 
Judicial Vacancies in Northern District (Aug. 5, 2014), 
https://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/durbin-white-house-
nominates-two-to-fill-federal-judicial-vacancies-in-northern-district. 
186. FLA. R.P. 1, FED. JUD. NOMINATING COMM'N, https://www.floridabar.org 
/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Federal-JNC-Rules-2017-19.pdf; see Jay Weaver, 
Former Prosecutor, Two Miami Judges To Be Nominated to South Florida 
Federal Bench, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 13, 2018, 8:32 PM), 
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/ article 199972219 .html. 
187. See sources cited supra note 181. But see 143 CONG. REC. 4253--54 (1997) 
(statement of Sen. Biden) (stating that there are limits as to the level of 
negotiation possible). 
188. The systems that members now use suggest opposition senators can pick 
one in three or four. Using 2018, in states with two Democrats, Democrats 
choose; in states with two GOP members, the senior Democratic official picks; 
and in states with split delegations, the Democrat picks. All lawmakers then 
must work with the President. 
189. See infra note 196 and accompanying text. The lawmakers also may send 
multiple picks and rank them to increase flexibility and expedite selection by 
obviating the need to start over when the President and senators differ. 
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require omission, as the District of Columbia lacks senators and the 
White House customarily heads this nomination regime.190 Because 
appellate court positions are empty infrequently and the circuits 
encompass a few states, the bipartisan judiciary may apply best to 
courts with numerous judges.191 However, those operational factors 
and perceptions that seating these jurists is distinctly political, 
complex, and crucial-as circuit opinions enunciate substantially 
more policy and, therefore, raise the stakes-indicate excluding 
courts of appeals would be preferable. 
Congress should package the bipartisan judiciary device with 
legislation that authorizes fifty-seven court posts.192 This would 
actualize Judicial Conference recommendations from lawmakers in 
2017, astutely derived by the federal courts' policymaking arm from 
conservative approximations of case and workloads that will grant 
tribunals resources necessary to supply justice.193 Those constructs 
must take effect over 2019 or 2021, thus marshaling advantages for 
neither party when first created by decreasing the ability to game the 
regime.194 
Combining a bipartisan judiciary and fifty-seven positions, which 
the Judicial Conference recommended to Congress, l95 could yield 
multiple benefits. It would halt or slow the process's slide while 
affording each party incentives to collaborate as well as jurists who 
are comparatively diverse vis-a-vis experience, ideology, ethnicity, 
gender, and sexual orientation. Had senators adopted this idea in 
2018, with implementation correspondingly mustered during next 
year, the concept would have minimized both parties' opportunities to 
extract unfair advantages, although the notion could be prescribed in 
early 2019 or late 2020. 
Nonetheless, implementing this proposal might require some 
care. For example, Joe Biden, when he was a Delaware legislator, 
190. Those courts with a bipartisan judiciary could be matters for negotiation 
or be left to the opposition party. Small districts may warrant exclusion, as they 
rarely experience vacancies. See sources cited supra note 17 4. 
191. Even the Ninth Circuit, the largest, has vacancies once in a generation 
in Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, and Montana. 28 U.S.C. § 44(c) (2012) requires that 
each circuit's states have one active judge. 
192. Judicial Conference Asks Congress to Create New Judgeships, UNITED 
STATES CTS. (Mar. 18, 2003), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2003/03/18/judicial-
conference-asks-congress-create-5 7-new-judgeships [hereinafter Judicial 
Conference New Judgeships]; see also Tobias, supra note 106, at 140. If the 
selection process keeps spiraling downward, more judgeships will not improve 
selection or the judicial vacancy crisis. 
193. JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. 16-17 (2017), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default 
/files/2017-03_0.pdf; see Federal Judgeship Act of 2013, S. 1385, 113th Cong. 
(2013) (providing the most recent comprehensive judgeships bill). 
194. When the parties agree before elections, it is more difficult to game the 
system. Midterm election years seem less felicitous than presidential ones, as 
the President is not running, will remain in office, and may fail to cooperate. 
195. Judicial Conference New Judgeships, supra note 192. 
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castigated a related proposition because it was unconventional and 
the Constitution says that the President nominates and confirms 
jurists with Senate advice and consent.196 However, Biden's point 
applies equally to the unprecedented gridlock manifested since 2009, 
while a bipartisan judiciary can actually be devised which respects 
the Constitution.197 Initiating this effort appears complicated, but 
most difficulties could be felicitously treated.198 
Another longer-term possibility would be reforming the filibuster 
that was integral to the modern confirmation wars. Filibuster 
traditionally safeguarded the minority party, but various abuses 
show this concept now deserves greater recalibration.199 For example, 
application could be limited to nominees without the intelligence, 
ethics, temperament, diligence, or independence for providing 
exceptional court service. This goal would be achieved through 
permitting filibusters only in "extraordinary circumstances," a 
framework that served rather efficaciously across 2005, while 
comprehensively defining the precept.200 These actions might 
facilitate reinstatement of sixty votes for cloture, a decision that 
196. Eiden was alluding to "trades" between senators and President Clinton, 
which the Republicans proposed. Georgia senators and Obama seemed to employ 
trades when they could not agree on nominees for many Georgia vacancies. Dan 
Malloy, The Delegation of Georgians in D.C.: Woodall Does Balancing Act in 
House GOP Post, ATLANTA J. CONST., July 20, 2014, at A14; see 2017 National 
Lawyers Convention, supra note 51 (highlighting McGahn's similar view on 
consultation). 
197. The Constitution does not bar these concepts, to which Trump and 
Congress can agree. The ideas may further politicize selection or deny political 
victors spoils. However, they could improve selection. The confirmation wars 
need to end, and litigant and judicial needs must be paramount. For 
"unprecedented," see Josh Chafetz, Unprecedented: Judicial Confirmation 
Battles and the Search for a Usable Past, 131 HARV. L. REV. 96, 96, 98-99 (2017); 
Michael Gerhardt, Practice Makes Precedent, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 32, 39--40 
(2017). 
198. Congress has treated more complex issues, notably how to resolve 
substantial, increasingly complex dockets with comparatively few resources, by 
authorizing many judgeships, but the last comprehensive law passed in 1990. 
See Federal Judgeship Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 201-206, 104 Stat. 
5089, 5098-04. The ideas above treat many issues that a bipartisan judiciary 
may create. 
199. Filibuster abuse led to the nuclear option's detonation, which narrowed 
use by requiring a majority vote for cloture, while GOP refusal to grant Obama 
nominees 2015--16 floor votes was abusive, as may be 2017-18 nearly automatic 
cloture petitions, which consume thirty hours of floor time. See sources cited 
supra notes 38-39, 106, 113-14. 
200. See Michael Gerhardt & Richard Painter, "Extraordinary 
Circumstances':· The Legacy of the Gang of 14 and a Proposal for Judicial 
Nominations Reform, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 969, 970 (2012); Text of Senate 
Compromise on Judge Nominations, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2005, at A18. Some 
senators argued that nominee ideological views and the number of court cases 
and judges were not extraordinary in a dispute over three D.C. Circuit vacancies. 
Tobias, supra note 106, at 126-28. But see id. at 125--27. 
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would reverse the nuclear option and perhaps stimulate enhanced 
cooperation.201 
VI. CONCLUSION 
President Donald Trump and the 115th Senate have insistently 
continued and exacerbated the rampant, counterproductive dynamics 
which attend the renewed and increasingly destructive confirmation 
wars. Therefore, his administration must collaborate with 
Republican and Democratic lawmakers to cure or ameliorate the 
federal vacancy crisis that has been acutely undermining the courts 
for the good of litigants, the judiciary, the President, the Senate, and 
the country. 
201. The GOP maintains a Senate majority, so it may oppose the changes, but 
filibuster reform can be one aspect of a global solution, which also mandates two 
hours of post-cloture debate for district nominees. See sources cited supra note 
114. The GOP will not retain the majority forever and may agree to this trade. 
Tobias, supra note 106, at 140; see sources cited supra notes 44-46. An effective 
2007-08 custom was floor votes on all strong, centrist district nominees before 
long Senate recesses. Tobias, supra note 37, at 31. The Senate could also use 
many other customs to reinstitute regular order. 
*** 
